Legal Brief

International Human Rights Clinic
Harvard Law School
&
Center for Human Rights and Global Justice
New York University School of Law

before

The Standing Committee on the Foreign Affairs and International Development (FAAE)
House of Commons

Regarding Bill C-300

Ottawa, Canada

November 16, 2009

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1 The International Human Rights Clinic (the Clinic) and the Center for Human Rights and Global Justice (the Center) understand that this submission to the Standing Committee is covered by the Parliamentary privilege and to the extent there is a need to assert such privilege, the Clinic and the Center hereby do.
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This brief supplements testimony and written submissions regarding Bill C-300 provided by Mr. Tyler Giannini and Ms. Sarah Knuckey on October 20, 2009 to the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development of Canada’s House of Commons. The brief further details the need for an independent investigation into the allegations of abuse surrounding the Porgera Joint Venture (PJV) gold mine in Papua New Guinea (PNG).

The PJV gold mine is located in the Porgera Valley, a remote region in the mountainous Enga Province of PNG. Since it began operations in 1990, the PJV mine has been operated and co-owned by Canadian mining companies—first by Placer Dome, and since 2006 by Barrick. The mine is also partially owned by the PNG Government and local landowners.

Over the past two decades, there have been consistent and widespread allegations of human rights abuses committed by PJV security personnel in and around the mine site. During three fact-finding missions to PNG, researchers from the International Human Rights Clinic at Harvard Law School and the Center for Human Rights and Global Justice at New York University School of Law (collectively, the research team) conducted more than 250 interviews about mining in Porgera. Many of the witnesses recounted their concerns about the mine, including environmental and health problems, as well as allegations of violence by PJV and government security forces. This brief focuses on the allegations of violence and physical abuse. Local residents and community members claim that mine security personnel have used excessive or abusive force while carrying out their duties, and have killed individuals both on mine property and outside the boundaries of the mine. According to reports by alleged victims and witnesses, PJV security personnel have engaged in physical abuse and rape.

In addition to these accounts of abuse, the research team has discovered and documented a close relationship between PJV security personnel and PNG police and security forces. In particular, government officials and police officers have reported that government police reservists and Mobile Police Squads act as security for the PJV mine. A 2005 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the PJV and the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary (RPNGC) provides that state police reservists will be deployed to the mine and be “employees of the PJV.” These reservists have comprised an armed branch of the PJV’s security and, according to local accounts, have been responsible for many of the alleged human rights violations documented by the research team. Additionally, government officials have reported that the reservists exercise police arrest and investigative powers within the mine site. A number of other agreements between the PJV and the PNG Government provide for cooperation in law enforcement activities relating to the mine. One such agreement provides for the deployment to the mine of Mobile Police Squads, who have also allegedly committed abuses. According to police officials, the PJV has covered at least some costs related to these deployments.

The research team spoke with alleged victims; witnesses; family members of alleged victims; local residents; local and international civil society representatives; local health officials; government officials at the local, provincial, and national levels; police; mine staff; and current and former PJV security guards. The interviews that are referenced in this submission are personal accounts, and citations indicate the recollections of events of the given individual. The interviews are on file with the Clinic. The research team has also reviewed medical and police records and documents.
To date, the PNG Government has not adequately investigated allegations of gross human rights violations related to the mine. Local police investigations appear to be hampered by a lack of will and independence as well as insufficient resources. In addition, the police have reported that, at times, they have been obstructed by PJV officials when police have attempted to carry out investigations at alleged crime scenes on mine property. Many alleged victims stated that they do not initiate complaints with the police. This is often because they believe that investigators will not pursue their claims, or because of fear that they themselves will be prosecuted for trespassing or threatened if they bring forward allegations against PJV personnel. At the national level, the PNG Government established a Porgera Investigative Committee (the Committee) in 2005 to look into deaths in and around the PJV mine. The Committee concluded its study in 2006, but the Government has not released its findings. In addition, while the PJV appears to investigate incidents of violence occurring within the mine, there is an inherent conflict of interest in such an undertaking, as it is PJV personnel who are alleged to have committed these abuses. Furthermore, police have reported that the results of such internal investigations are not always shared with them. It remains unclear how many PJV investigations have led to prosecutions or disciplinary action.

The allegations documented in this brief raise serious concerns that grave human rights violations have been committed at the PJV mine, namely violations of the right to life and the right to be free from cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment and torture, including rape. Some of the actions of PJV security personnel may have been justifiable on the grounds that force was lawfully used to protect property or life. However, all incidents of violence and death related to the mine merit independent investigation.

Under international law, the PNG Government has a duty to provide effective remedies and to investigate allegations of human rights abuses. Investigations should be independent, transparent, and comprehensive. Insofar as violations have occurred, the Government has an obligation to prosecute and punish perpetrators and to take effective measures to prevent further abuses. The Government should provide local authorities with the mandate, independence, and resources necessary to address alleged violations related to the mine. Similarly, the manager and

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4 See supra note 3.
operator of the mine, Canadian company Barrick, has committed itself to uphold human rights and corporate social responsibility standards, including those found in the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights (Voluntary Principles). Such standards should be applied at the PJV mine. Barrick should respect human rights and cooperate with independent investigations to address allegations in an open and transparent manner.

Bill C-300 is intended to ensure that Canadian corporations behave in a manner consistent with international human rights standards. This legislation is particularly relevant in a case such as this, where, despite consistent allegations of abuse, independent investigations have failed to materialize. Bill C-300 establishes clear and manageable guidelines for assessing the conduct of PJV personnel and the allegations of excessive use of force. To date, alleged victims’ complaints have not been adequately addressed. As the MOU illustrates, the PNG Government and the PJV have a relationship that suggests an inherent conflict of interest that reduces the likelihood of impartial investigations. In such circumstances, Bill C-300 would function to permit neutral third parties to fill the gap and conduct independent investigations, and encourage accountability and the prevention of future violence.
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\* Names in these documents have been redacted to protect the identity of the concerned individuals. Original copies of these documents are on file with the Clinic.
# ACRONYMS

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<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>CID</td>
<td>Criminal Investigation Department</td>
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<td>International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights</td>
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<td>LMP</td>
<td>Lease for Mining Purposes</td>
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<td>MDC</td>
<td>Mining Development Contract for the Porgera Project</td>
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<td>MOA</td>
<td>Memorandum of Agreement Relating to the Development of the Porgera Gold Mine Project</td>
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<td>RPNGC</td>
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<td>SML</td>
<td>Special Mining Lease</td>
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II. THE PJV MINE

A. Background

The PJV gold mine is located in the Porgera Valley of Enga Province in the highlands of PNG. PNG is one of the most ethnically diverse countries in the world with over 800 indigenous languages and several thousand separate communities. PNG is also well known for its immense biodiversity and its wealth of natural resources, including gold, copper, and oil. As a result, mining plays a prominent role in PNG's economy. According to one recent estimate, mineral resources comprise about two-thirds of the country's export earnings.

Small-scale alluvial gold mining in the Porgera Valley dates to at least the 1930s. In 1989, the PNG Government signed a Mining Development Contract (MDC) with the PJV, granting it a Special Mining Lease (SML) for 20 years in the Porgera area. One of the original members of the PJV was a Canadian company, Placer Dome. Placer Dome was the operator until 2006 when it was acquired by another Canadian company, Barrick Gold Corporation. According to its 2008 filing with the U.S. Security Exchange Commission, Barrick's subsidiary holds a 95% stake in the PJV and is the primary operator of the Porgera mine.

The PJV has been extracting gold through both open pit and underground mining methods. Waste rock from the pit has been disposed of in waste dump areas around the mine (see Photo #1). Mining waste and effluents, known as tailings, have also been released into the local river system. In 2008, approximately 45.5 million tons were mined, and approximately 6.3 million tons of ore were processed. Given the immense size of its operations, the PJV mine dominates the landscape in the area. The SML area presently covers about 2,347 hectares and includes

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12 U.S. SEC Barrick Form 40-F, supra note 9, at 59.
13 Id.
14 Barrick, Barrick Global Operations, supra note 5.
15 U.S. SEC Barrick Form 40-F, supra note 9, at 63.
16 See Appendix A: Mine Visuals.
the mine area itself as well as other areas used for project infrastructure.\textsuperscript{17} The PNG Government has also granted Leases for Mining Purposes (LMPs), which permit land use for related mining operations such as “waste dumps, campsites, water supply, power generation and airstrip.”\textsuperscript{18} The mountainside has been replaced by an immense open pit, massive waste dumps, and a red river of tailings.

![Photo #1: View of the PJV mine's open pit, a waste dump, and tailings stream. (Source: Taken by research team on March 22, 2009)](image)

The presence of the PJV mine has dramatically changed the landscape and significantly altered the local way of life. The population in the area has vastly expanded since the 1990s, in large part because of the gold economy. Before the mine was established, approximately 5,000 lived near the mine site; by 2010, projections estimate that number to increase to 50,000.\textsuperscript{19} The population growth has resulted in overcrowding and unemployment as there have been a limited number of jobs and no other industry to sustain the local economy.\textsuperscript{20}

Before the mine began operations, Porgera residents relied primarily on subsistence farming, animal husbandry, and small-scale mining for their livelihoods. As the mine has expanded, local inhabitants, including landowners, have had to relocate, and farming has been increasingly disrupted. Families have been forced to move to land that they believe is less fertile and yields

\textsuperscript{17} U.S. SEC Barrick Form 40-F, supra note 9, at 59.

\textsuperscript{18} Id.


\textsuperscript{20} Opis J. Papo, A Long Term Strategy to Address Law & Order Problems in Porgera (Mar. 2009) (on file with Clinic).
fewer crops. They have also expressed concern that pollution from the mine may be affecting their crops. Indeed, the research team observed that the mine site, waste dumps, and polluted streams are in close proximity to some homes and gardens. Landowners have further complained that the mine expansion has resulted in a shortage of land. Adding to these challenges, the research team observed that the relocation areas are severely overcrowded, a problem exacerbated by the need to accommodate extended family members who have moved to the area. As subsistence farming has become increasingly difficult, individuals have been seeking alternative sources of income.

The rivers where individuals previously panned for gold have been filled with sediment from the mine, making it more difficult to find gold. Rather than panning for gold, as was the practice for many years before the establishment of the mine, individuals have been exposing themselves to the dangers inherent in obtaining gold from rock debris gathered from the open pit, waste dumps, and tailings. Interviews by the research team suggest that, on certain days, hundreds have been trespassing onto the mine site in search of gold.

This trespassing has led the mine operators to adopt a range of security measures, including the employment of armed security personnel to patrol the perimeter and waste dump, stockpile, and open pit areas of the mine site. According to local residents, the security personnel have often used violence in the course of their duties.

B. Security at the Mine

For many years, residents near the PJV mine have expressed concerns about the relationship between PNG police and PJV security personnel. Neither the PJV nor the Government has publicly disclosed the precise role of state security officers in the protection of the mine. However, the research team obtained a number of relevant documents and interviewed police officials, and has been able to clarify the relationship between PNG state security forces and the PJV mine.

Several agreements relating to the mine, including the 1989 MDC and a 1998 Fly-In/Fly-Out Agreement, demonstrate a cooperative relationship between the PJV and the PNG Government. These agreements provide for an increased police presence in the Porgera Valley, partially funded by the PJV. Additionally, a 2005 MOU between the PJV and the RPNGC formalizes the relationship between the joint venture and the Government by integrating police reservists into

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22 See, e.g., Interviews PNG #40 (2006) (gardens polluted); PNG #114 (2007) (soil no longer good); PNG #131 (2007) (believes pollution is killing plants); PNG #146 (2007) (“Vegetables don’t grow well. I think it’s because of pollution.”).

23 See, e.g., Interviews PNG #113 (2006) (“We can’t grow a garden to live off as there is no land to do it.”); PNG #144 (2007) (“Now I am short of land... There isn’t enough space.”); PNG #156 (2007) (reported that local residents complain of a shortage of land); PNG #171 (2007) (“I said we wanted land... because of a shortage of land.”).

24 See Interviews PNG #202 (2009); PNG #226 (2009); PNG #260 (2009).
the PJV security force. The MOU calls for “the deployment of an agreed number of Reserve Police (who are employees of the PJV).” Under the MOU, the PJV provides monetary support for these reservists.26

An Annexure to the MDC, signed in May 1989, establishes that the Government would expand the police force in Porgera and that the PJV and the Government would jointly fund the construction of a new police station and associated housing.27 The Annexure also provides for the “permanent” deployment of a Mobile Police Squad to Porgera, for which the PJV would provide at least some funding assistance.28 According to a senior RPNGC officer interviewed in 2009, Mobile Police Squads of 35 to 40 police “regulars” can be called in “if the situation at the mine gets out of hand and beyond the control of the security guards.”29 The same officer further stated that the PJV has been paying for transportation, accommodation, meals, and a quarter of the daily allowance for Mobile Police Squad personnel in Porgera.30 The officer also indicated that Mobile Police Squads, at times, have been assigned directly to the mine and report to the PJV Security Manager, who in turn reports to the mine's General Manager.31

Additionally, in 1989 the PNG Government and Porgera landowners signed a Memorandum of Agreement Relating to the Development of the Porgera Gold Mine Project (MOA), which provides that the Government should “increase reserve police to numbers sufficient to provide effective support to full-time police officers stationed at Porgera.”32 In 1998, the PJV, the PNG Government, local government bodies, and local landowners signed a Fly-In/Fly-Out Agreement, with the purpose of developing the area around the mine and promoting local employment at the PJV mine site.33 The agreement also includes provisions regarding security that requires the Government to promote law and order in the area surrounding the mine by:

- Increasing “the number of regular policeman stationed at Porgera to a minimum of thirty” and maintaining “at least that number for the remainder of the life of the Porgera Mine”;

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25 Memorandum of Understanding Between the Porgera Joint Venture and the Royal PNG Constabulary, § 1 (2005) [hereinafter MOU].
26 Id. at § 2.1.
27 See Letter from Placer (PNG) Pty Limited to the Secretary, Department of Minerals and Energy (Porgera Project – Proposal for Development, Annexure “A,” Clause E to the Mining Development Contract of 3 April 1989) (May 12, 1989) [hereinafter Annexure A] (see Appendix B: Official Documents) (“This letter confirms the following additional obligations and undertakings agreed to between the Joint Venturers and the Minister: . . . E. Law and Order: 1. The State will increase the police staffing level at Porgera to 18 officers once the new police station and associated housing now being constructed with funds provided jointly by the Joint Venturers and the State is completed. 2. The Joint Venturers will assist, to an extent to be agreed, in funding the stationing of a Mobile Squad at Porgera on a permanent basis.”).
28 The precise parameters of the funding assistance are not detailed in the Annexure, which states the support is “to an extent to be agreed.” Id.
29 Interview PNG #260 (2009).
30 Id.
31 Id.
• Establishing a Reserve Constabulary “of a minimum of 40 personnel”;
• Providing a “Police Public Relations Officer to carry out Liaison with the Village courts, Community and District Administrator”; and
• Building and maintaining a “Corrective Institution . . . to hold prisoners for a period of up to six months.”

In March of 2009, a senior police official shared with the research team a 2005 MOU between the PJV and the RPNGC. The senior official stated that a signed copy of the MOU was on file with the PNG Police Commissioner. The research team was able to transcribe the MOU in its entirety. Under the MOU:

• “The Commissioner of the Police of the RPNGC authorizes the deployment of an agreed number of Reserve Police (who are employees of the PJV)”;
• “[T]he approved manpower ceiling shall not exceed 100 members without the express permission of the Commissioner or his authorized designate”;
• “The PJV shall be responsible for all costs and expenses associated with the Reserve Police, made up of authorized PJV employees, including remuneration, training and the provisions of uniforms and equipment”;
• The PJV “undertakes” to indemnify the reservists employed by the PJV and to provide the Government with monthly “Reserve Police reports,” including “giving manpower details and movements, arrest particulars”;
• The reservists are employees of the PJV and are assigned primarily to protect the mine, but they are trained by the RPNGC and fall under the command of the Commissioner of the RPNGC; and
• When necessary, the reservists may be deployed to assist with police operations outside the mine.

Police officers and others interviewed by the research team have provided further details about the role of police reservists within the PJV security forces. The PJV security personnel have been divided into two classes: (1) unarmed guards who man the gates and the perimeter of the mine, wear company uniforms, and are often hired from the local population, and (2) Reserve Police who carry firearms, often wear RPNGC uniforms, and receive training and discipline from the PNG police force. According to local, provincial, and national-level police officers, reservists have been subject to overlapping command structures, taking day-to-day orders from the PJV’s Security Manager but falling under the formal authority of the Commissioner of the

34 Id. at 11-12.
35 MOU, supra note 25, at § 1.
36 Id. at § 1.7.
37 Id. at § 2.1.
38 See id. at § 2.3.
39 Id. at § 2.4.
40 Id. at § 1.4.
41 Id. at § 1.1.
42 Id. at § 1.8.
43 Interviews PNG #199 (2009); PNG #214 (2009); PNG #216 (2009); PNG #228 (2009); PNG #255 (2009); PNG #260 (2009).
RPNGC. One local officer who had not seen the MOU said that he thought the reservists were “supposed to report” to the Police Station Commissioner (PSC) in Porgera, but in fact the officer knew that they had not been doing so. The MOU indeed requires the reservists to report to the PSC. Moreover, according to police officials, the reservists have been exercising the same powers as regular police officers, including the power to arrest, detain, question, and charge individuals with offenses. Police reservists have been carrying the same firearms as regular police officers and frequently have been escorting PJV vehicles through the region. Locals have reported that some PJV vehicles have used official government license plates. The research team observed police reservists, one of whom stated that he worked at the mine, using police vehicles (see Photos #2, #3, and #4).

These cooperative arrangements between the PJV and state security forces raise serious concerns regarding the Government’s duty, under international law, to respect and protect human rights. Since the PJV and the Government are collaborating and jointly undertaking a state function, allegations against PJV security personnel should be measured against international human rights obligations as they apply to states. The close relationship between the PJV and the Government also casts doubt upon the impartiality of the parties and the Government’s ability to independently investigate persistent allegations of human rights violations related to the mine.

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44 Interviews PNG #214 (2009); PNG #216 (2009); PNG #255 (2009); PNG #257 (2009); PNG #260 (2009). See also Interviews PNG #199 (2009); PNG #222 (2009); PNG #228 (2009); PNG #258 (2009).
45 Interview PNG #228 (2009).
46 MOU, supra note 25, at § 1.3 (“The Police Station Commissioner (PSC), Porgera, shall be responsible for the daily supervision and discipline of the Reserve Police whilst they are performing their duties.”).
47 Interviews PNG #200 (2009); PNG #216 (2009); PNG #258 (2009); PNG #260 (2009); see also MOU, supra note 25, at § 1.6 (“Reserve Police may be vested with such powers of the regular Constabulary as is considered necessary by the Commissioner.”).
48 Interviews PNG #214 (2009); PNG #216 (2009); PNG #222 (2009); PNG #255 (2009).
49 Letter from the Porgera SML Landowner’s Association to the Hon. Arthur Somare, Minister for Planning and Rural Development, at 3 (May 16, 2005) (re: Submission to Have the National Government Investigate and Disarm PJV’s Security Force) (on file with Clinic); see also Interviews PNG #199 (2009); PNG #200 (2009); PNG #228 (2009).
Photos #2: Armed reservist entering vehicle with government license plates. (Source: Taken by research team on March 25, 2009)

Photo #3: Same vehicle as in Photo #2, with the Royal PNG Constabulary logo, entered by armed reservist. (Source: Taken by research team on March 25, 2009)

Photos #4: Police reservist with "police" badge who identified himself as working at the mine site. (Source: Taken by research team on March 25, 2009)
III. VIOLENCE RELATED TO THE MINE

There have been allegations of violence of and of excessive force in or near the mine site, including rapes, killings, and physical abuse. The research team collected information on alleged abuses during three field missions in August 2006, March and April 2007, and March 2009. Specific incidents of reported abuse are outlined below, as well as the patterns of abuse drawn from accounts of alleged victims and witnesses, which span years of operations at the mine site. The large number and consistency of accounts creates a *prima facie* case for further investigation.

A. Sexual Violence


Nevertheless, the research team gathered multiple accounts from women who reported being raped by PJV security personnel between the mid-1990s and 2008. See, e.g., Interviews PNG #2 (2006) (raped by three security personnel); PNG #3 (2006) (raped by five security personnel); PNG #7 (2006) (raped by nine security personnel); PNG #9 (2006) (attempted rape by nine security personnel); PNG #10 (2006) (raped by five security personnel); PNG #11 (2006) (witnessed a rape committed by two security personnel while two other security personnel stood by); PNG #212 (2009) (raped by three security personnel); PNG #221 (2009) (raped by five security personnel); PNG #237 (2009) (raped by two security personnel while three other security personnel stood by); PNG #247 (2009) (raped by four security personnel).

Some of the women reported that the


- **Beatings and ill-treatment.** Alleged victims were also subjected to beatings, usually with fists and boots or with the butts of guns. Some of the women reported that the

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51 See, e.g., Interviews PNG #2 (2006) (raped by three security personnel); PNG #3 (2006) (raped by five security personnel); PNG #7 (2006) (raped by nine security personnel); PNG #9 (2006) (attempted rape by nine security personnel); PNG #10 (2006) (raped by five security personnel); PNG #11 (2006) (witnessed a rape committed by two security personnel while two other security personnel stood by); PNG #212 (2009) (raped by three security personnel); PNG #221 (2009) (raped by five security personnel); PNG #237 (2009) (raped by two security personnel while three other security personnel stood by); PNG #247 (2009) (raped by four security personnel).

52 See, e.g., Interviews PNG #3 (2006) (female victim kicked and hit with butt of gun by security personnel); PNG #9 (2006) (female victim beaten with a wooden stick, hit with butt of gun, and kicked by security personnel); PNG #10 (2006) (female victim slapped by security personnel); PNG #221 (2009) (female victim punched by security personnel); PNG #237 (2009) (female victim punched and hit with butt of gun by security personnel); PNG #247 (2009) (female victim hit with butt of gun and had barrel of gun put in mouth by security personnel).
PJV security tore off their clothing, leaving them naked. A few women also reported that PJV security ordered them to chew or swallow the condoms used during the rapes. In the majority of accounts, at least one of the security personnel was armed during the rape.

- **Threats of imprisonment.** Some of the women reported that PJV security threatened to jail them if they did not “let” the security personnel rape them.

- **Rapes on mine property.** Women and witnesses stated that rapes usually occurred on mine property, after security personnel apprehended women who were searching for gold.

- **Underreporting to officials.** Women reported that they generally had not filed complaints about these incidents. They generally believed that police officials would not investigate their complaints, or that the police would imprison them for trespassing on mine property. In addition, victims of rape are often stigmatized, with rapes reportedly leading some husbands to leave or divorce their wives.

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53 See, e.g., Interviews PNG #7 (2006) (security personnel removed all of her clothes); PNG #212 (2009) (security personnel broke her shirt, skirt, and trousers so that she was naked when they raped her); PNG #221 (2009) (security personnel removed her trousers, shirt, underwear, and bra so she was naked); PNG #247 (2009) (security personnel broke her trousers and cut off her shirt, underwear, and bra).

54 See, e.g., Interviews PNG #2 (2006) (security personnel ordered woman to eat all the used condoms and chew them); PNG #7 (2006) (security personnel put condoms in woman’s mouth and ordered her to eat and swallow them).

55 See, e.g., Interviews PNG #2 (2006) (security personnel carried one gun) PNG #3 (2006) (security personnel carried five guns); PNG #7 (2006) (security personnel carried three guns); PNG #9 (2006) (security personnel carried one gun); PNG #10 (2006) (security personnel carried three guns); PNG #238 (2009) (security personnel carried two guns); PNG #237 (2009) (security personnel carried three guns); PNG #247 (2009) (security personnel carried more than one gun).

56 See, e.g., Interviews PNG #2 (2006) (rape victim told by security personnel that if she did not want to go to the cell then he would rape her); PNG #9 (2006) (attempted rape victim told by security personnel that if she did not want to go to the cell then they would rape her); PNG #10 (2006) (rape victim told by security personnel that they would rape her instead of taking her to the cell); PNG #11 (2006) (security guard reported that personnel make a “deal” with women when they catch them and say, “If you don’t want to go to jail, we’ll rape you.”); PNG #221 (2009) (rape victim told by security personnel that if she did not want to go to jail then they would rape her); PNG #247 (2009) (rape victim offered the “choice” by security personnel between jail or rape).


58 See, e.g., Interviews PNG #2 (2006) (no report because victim believed that the police would take no action); PNG #3 (2006) (not reported to police); PNG #7 (2006) (not reported to police, as she was a child of age twelve); PNG #9 (not reported to police because victim was convinced that she would not receive any help); PNG #10 (2006) (not officially reported because she was scared); PNG #75 (2006) (reported to PJV security personnel but has not heard of any resolutions); PNG #212 (2009) (reported to police but no action taken); PNG #221 (2009) (accounted to family but did not officially report); PNG #237 (2009) (reported only to family); PNG #247 (2009) (reported only to the doctor and family, but not to the police).

59 See e.g., Interviews PNG #2 (2006) (believed she would not get any help from the police, so she did not report the rape); PNG #3 (2006) (said the police are close to security personnel so nothing would happen if she reported the rape); PNG #247 (2009) (said that she was afraid to go to the police because the security personnel are police too).

60 See, e.g., Interviews PNG #2 (2006) (husband told her that she would never give birth to his child); PNG #3 (2006) (husband left her).
The following are three accounts of gang rape reported to the research team:

**Incident #1**
One woman reported that three PJV security personnel raped her in 2003 while she was searching for gold in a waste dump. The 25-year-old woman explained that the dump had ruined her farming land, so she went to the mine site to get gold to survive. She recounted that while there, three security personnel caught her and told her that if she did not want to go to jail, they would rape her. She recalled that they had a gun and she did not try to run because she was scared. She explained that each of the three men raped her using a condom while the other two stood by and watched. After the rapes, the young woman described further degrading treatment and humiliating inflicted by the security personnel:

They said, “If you don’t want to go to the [jail] cell, you swallow all these condoms.” . . . They told me to eat the condom and swallow it. They told me to eat all three condoms at the same time. They told me not to spit out anything. The told me to chew them . . . After chewing, they told me to walk home.

The woman stated that she had not reported the rapes. She noted that the memory of the rapes still haunted her, and that she thought of the three men often, asking herself: “Why did those three security guards rape me?” She noted that relations with her husband were also strained by the incident, and she concluded by stating that she hoped to see the security personnel “locked up in prison.”

**Incident #2**
Another woman reported that three security personnel raped her in March 2005. The 30-year-old woman recounted that she was on her way to a mine dump area when three security guards caught her and told her that she could not go free unless she had sex with them. She explained that she struggled hard to get away, but that the guards punched her, slapped her, and held her down. She recalled that they tore off her shirt and trousers and that each of the three guards

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61 Interview PNG #2 (2006).
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id.
67 Interview PNG #2 (2009).
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Interview PNG #212 (2009).
71 Id.
72 Id.
raped her "one after the other." In recounting the attack, the mother of two children explained, "Whenever the security guards catch the ladies, that's what happens." The woman said that after the incident, the guards took her to the police station where she was jailed for two months. She explained that she was eventually taken to court for trespassing, and that she told the magistrate that she had been raped. She told the research team that the magistrate said, "[L]adies normally come here and give this excuse, so you will go directly to [prison]." She stated that she was ultimately sentenced to an additional five months in prison for trespassing.

**Incident #3**

Another woman reported that five PJV security personnel raped her in September 2008 while she was searching for gold near a stockpile area of the mine site. The 25-year-old woman explained that she resided just a few minutes walk from the mine and often went there to look for gold. She said that she used the money she made from selling the gold to purchase basic necessities for her family. She recounted that she was on mine property searching for gold when five security personnel came up behind her and grabbed her. She said that they asked her if she wanted to go home, or if she wanted to be sent to jail. She recalled that when she replied that she wanted to go home, they said they would rape her first. She explained that she tried to run away, but that the security personnel pointed a gun at her and threatened to shoot if she tried to escape. She noted that they also beat her legs and hit her with stones.

The woman explained that the security personnel threw her down on the rocks and tore off her shorts, shirt, and underwear. She recounted that each of the five security personnel took turns raping her while one of them pointed a gun at her and the others guarded the road. She recalled that they held her head down and punched her with the butt of a gun. During the interview with the research team, the woman pointed out scars on her shoulder and hand that she explained were the result of struggling during the rapes, and that she had needed hospital treatment for her injuries. The mother of two remembered feeling "destroyed" after the rapes. She recalled: "After the fifth one finished, my body was weak."

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73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Interview PNG #221 (2009).
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id.
A male relative corroborated the 25-year-old woman’s account.\textsuperscript{92} He recounted that he witnessed five security guards grab the woman, throw her down, and tear off her clothes.\textsuperscript{93} He explained that two of the security personnel had guns, so he hid in a bush nearby.\textsuperscript{94} He noted that after the attacks, he took the woman to the hospital for her injuries.\textsuperscript{95} He also noted that he reported the attack to the local police, but that they appeared to take no action.\textsuperscript{96}

Interviews with current and former security guards corroborate the rape allegations. One local PJV security guard, employed at the time of his interview, claimed that he had seen numerous women raped by men in his security unit during his several years of employment.\textsuperscript{97} A former PJV security guard, who had worked at the mine for two years, noted that, “Security . . . take girls to the bushes. Security deliberately goes looking for girls to rape. There are lots of condoms in the [security] cars.”\textsuperscript{98} During a 2006 mission to PNG, one member of the research team witnessed a guard yelling at a local woman that he had raped many women, and calling for her to come near him so that he could rape her too. Despite numerous allegations of rape, some police officers stated that they have not heard of any rapes, suggesting issues of underreporting.\textsuperscript{99} In 2009, one local police source reported that he had heard of rapes, but that such complaints are generally not thoroughly investigated.\textsuperscript{100} He explained that when there is a complaint of rape perpetrated by PJV security personnel, the police “do nothing” because the mine conducts its own investigation of the employees and sends the files to the local police, who accept the statements as true.\textsuperscript{101}

These incidents, and the police statements about investigations, raise serious concerns about whether the PNG Government and the PJV are meeting their respective obligations and commitments. The allegations of sexual violence, and specifically gang rapes, if true, amount to acts of torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, which are clearly prohibited under international law.\textsuperscript{102} Torture involves the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering by state officials or with their acquiescence for specified purposes, including punishing or intimidating individuals.\textsuperscript{103} The above accounts of rape involve severe pain and suffering.\textsuperscript{104} In

\textsuperscript{92} Interview PNG #238 (2009).
\textsuperscript{93} Id.
\textsuperscript{94} Id.
\textsuperscript{95} Id.
\textsuperscript{96} Id.
\textsuperscript{97} Interview PNG #24 (2006) (“I have seen seven different women be raped, with my own eyes”).
\textsuperscript{98} Interview PNG #94 (2006).
\textsuperscript{99} See Interviews PNG #228 (2009); PNG #255 (2009).
\textsuperscript{100} Interview PNG #200 (2009).
\textsuperscript{101} Id.
\textsuperscript{102} PNG is a party to the ICCPR, which prohibits torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 7. Under international law, torture is defined as “any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as . . . punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him . . . when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.” Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, art. 1(1) (Dec. 10, 1984) [hereinafter “Convention against Torture”]; see also Code of Conduct, supra note 3, art. 5, cmt. (b) (same elements).
\textsuperscript{103} Id.
\textsuperscript{104} Rape has been accepted as a form of torture. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T (1998), available at http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/Akayesu/judgement/akay001.htm.
addition, because the PJV has assumed a state function of policing under the 2005 MOU and because many of the security personnel are government police (state officials), alleged rapes of women by PJV police reservists would meet the state action requirement for torture. Finally, interviewees reported that security personnel have raped women to punish them for trespassing or to intimidate them to not trespass in the future.

B. Killings and Deaths

Local residents have described a number of deaths and killings involving alleged excessive use of force in and around the mine since the PJV commenced its operations. Although the exact number of deaths has not been definitively chronicled, there is widespread agreement from a variety of sources that many killings have occurred. According to Prime Minister Sir Michael Somare, as of 2005, 29 individuals reportedly had been killed at the mine. In November 2005, Placer Dome acknowledged that eight killings had occurred since 1996, including seven since February 2000.

The research team conducted 32 interviews of community members, police officers, PJV personnel, and government officials regarding killings. Though there appeared to be a lull in alleged killings in 2006 and part of 2007, the research team has gathered information about multiple instances of killings between 1992 and late 2008. The interviews reveal commonalities among the killings and deaths, including:

- **Cause of death.**
  - **Shootings.** PJV security personnel have shot and killed individuals, allegedly

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105 *Probe Looms for Mine Deaths*. The NATIONAL (PNG), May 6, 2005.


108 In 2007, there was a reported decline in the number of violent incidents and deaths, which has been attributed to several factors, including the initiation of the Porgera Investigation Committee, an increase of international attention, the construction by Barrick of a fence surrounding the mine, changes to security operations, and increased criminal penalties for trespassing. See, e.g., Interview PNG #200 (2009).

109 See, e.g., Interviews PNG #200 (2009) (two shooting deaths in 2006 and 2007; witness estimates four to five killings since 2006 including one in October 2008); PNG #209 (2009) (boy shot dead on July 22, 2008); PNG #219 (2009) (male shot dead on December 27, 2007); PNG #233 (2009) (male in 30s shot dead on December 28, 2007); PNG #251 (2009) (male shot dead on November 27, 2007); see also Interviews, supra note 107.
using excessive force, in and around the mine on multiple occasions.\textsuperscript{110} Those interviewed also recounted several incidents of non-lethal shooting.\textsuperscript{111} Police officers interviewed by the research team verified that the only PJV security personnel allowed to carry guns are the reservists or members of Mobile Police Squads assigned to the mine.\textsuperscript{112}

- Rocks. Several documented deaths occurred when individuals were crushed by falling rocks.\textsuperscript{113} Some of these deaths were the result of open-pit blasts\textsuperscript{114} or loose rocks.\textsuperscript{115} In other incidents, individuals recounted seeing PJV security personnel push rocks onto trespassers in the pit below.\textsuperscript{116}

- Location. Most victims were killed after entering the mine site in search of gold, but some were killed outside the mine area.\textsuperscript{117}

The following accounts are three examples of killings documented by the research team, which demonstrate a need for independent investigations:

**Incident #1**

One incident which should be investigated is the alleged killing of a fifteen-year-old male by mobile police; the PJV has reportedly impeded investigations of his death by local police.\textsuperscript{118} On

\textsuperscript{110} See Interviews, supra note 109.


\textsuperscript{112} Interviews PNG #216 (2009); PNG #228 (2009); PNG #229 (2009); PNG #239 (2009); PNG #260 (2009).


\textsuperscript{114} The mine regularly blasts areas of the open pit to expose ore. Individuals enter the mine to get such high-value ore after explosions.

\textsuperscript{115} Interview PNG #108 (2009).

\textsuperscript{116} Interviews PNG #206 (2009); PNG #210 (2009).

\textsuperscript{117} See, e.g., Interviews PNG #209 (2009) (boy shot outside mining area on July 22, 2008); PNG #219 (2009) (young man shot outside mining area on December 27, 2007); PNG #240 (2009) (male shot outside mining area on November 28, 2007).

\textsuperscript{118} Interviews PNG #209 (2009); PNG #216 (2009); PNG #226 (2009). See also Crime Report, Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary (July 27, 2008) (see Appendix C: Medical and Police Reports); Major Incident Brief, Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary (undated) (see Appendix C: Medical and Police Reports); Autopsy Report, Porgera Hospital in Piaim (July 2008) (see Appendix C: Medical and Police Reports).
July 22, 2008 between 8pm and 11pm, the youth was reportedly shot and killed outside the mine site.\(^{119}\) A witness, who was with the eighth grader, recalled that the victim was among hundreds who were planning to enter the pit that evening.\(^{120}\) The witness explained that the miners could not get through the fence because PJV security was there, so the group started throwing stones at the fence to get the guards to leave.\(^{121}\) The witness surmised that the security guards must have called for armed reinforcements because the Mobile Police Squad arrived and opened fire on the group from behind the mine fence.\(^{122}\) The witness described the incident:

[There] was a stream of shooting... [The victim] fell down. I saw him fall down... [H]e was shot... [H]is body was shaking all over when he was on the ground.\(^{123}\)

A relative, who arrived at the scene after the shooting began, also noted that Mobile Police were present in the mine site.\(^{124}\) One witness reported that after the shooting, he retrieved the body and brought it to the security gate of the mine the next morning for an ambulance to take it for a post-mortem.\(^{125}\) The autopsy report revealed that the fifteen-year-old male died from a gunshot wound to the head and that he had received a second gunshot wound to his abdomen.\(^{126}\) The witnesses recounted that after the body was taken away from the mine, they were interviewed for hours by expatriate PJV officials.\(^{127}\) The crime report identified the incident as a “police shooting resulting [in] death.”\(^{128}\) A local law enforcement official looking into the matter wrote in his Major Incident Brief:

The deceased was outside the perimeter fence line known as 36 Level at the PJV mine site about 150 metres above the high ground. The MS14 [Mobile Squad-14] members of Goroka, who were on low ground fired upwards that had [sic] resulted in his death. The policemen were there on hire [sic] basis by PJV when the incident occurred.\(^{129}\)

In an interview in 2009 with the local law enforcement official, he explained that the death was the result of shooting by two members of the Mobile Police Squad who had started firing on suspected illegal miners outside the mine site.\(^{130}\) He went on to state that he had tried to investigate the incident and had requested a timesheet from the PJV to identify the shooters, but that the PJV had not supplied the information.\(^{131}\) As such, the incident report noted: “Crime scene unvisited, post mortem done and investigations are still continuing due to obstructive

\(^{119}\) See supra note 118.
\(^{120}\) Interview PNG #226 (2009).
\(^{121}\) Id.
\(^{122}\) Id.
\(^{123}\) Id.
\(^{124}\) Interview PNG #209 (2009).
\(^{125}\) Id.
\(^{126}\) Autopsy Report, supra note 118.
\(^{127}\) Interviews PNG #209 (2009); PNG #226 (2009).
\(^{128}\) Crime Report, supra note 118.
\(^{129}\) Major Incident Brief, supra note 118.
\(^{130}\) Interview PNG #216 (2009).
\(^{131}\) Id.
manner [sic] by mine site police.\textsuperscript{132}

\textbf{Incident \#2}

A second incident that demonstrates the need for independent investigations is the alleged killing of a 23-year-old male by PJV security.\textsuperscript{133} On December 27, 2007 at 9am near the Allipis and Wangima villages, a witness said the man was shot and killed while outside the fence around the mine pit.\textsuperscript{134} The witness, who was present during the entire incident, explained that the deceased was going to look for firewood while a group of people, including women and children, were panning for gold in a nearby creek.\textsuperscript{135} The witness recounted that the PJV security personnel had parked their vehicle on the ridge above the creek when three armed security personnel exited the vehicle and opened fire on the group.\textsuperscript{136} A newspaper account of the incident states that a gun battle occurred between PJV security and the group.\textsuperscript{137} According to the news account, the young man was shot in the back and fell.\textsuperscript{138} After the PJV left, the witness and other people in the group retrieved the victim’s body and took it to the hospital at Paiam.\textsuperscript{139} The subsequent autopsy revealed that the man died as a result of gunshot wounds to the back.\textsuperscript{140} The autopsy report also noted that the “deceased was among a group of illegal miners at PJV site, 36 levels, when the company security men open fired [sic] and shot him dead.”\textsuperscript{141} There appears to be agreement among witness accounts and documents that the male was shot and killed by PJV security personnel. As such, an investigation is essential to determine whether the shooting was unjustified and illegal or whether it was a necessary and proportionate response in the circumstances.

\textbf{Incident \#3}

Another incident that demonstrates the need for unbiased investigations is the alleged killing of a male in his early twenties by PJV security, where the cause of the shooting was unclear.\textsuperscript{142} On November 28, 2007 around 1am or 2am, the young man was reportedly shot and killed outside of the mine gate near the PJV community relations office.\textsuperscript{143} A witness, who was with the young man at the time of the incident, reported that they were walking back from a disco in a group of about ten men, some of whom had been drinking, when they passed a mine gate.\textsuperscript{144} Several witnesses recalled that the victim stopped at the gate when he recognized a security guard who owed him money and began demanding repayment.\textsuperscript{145} The witnesses stated that the security

\textsuperscript{132} Major Incident Brief, \textit{supra} note 118.
\textsuperscript{133} Interview PNG #219 (2009).
\textsuperscript{134} Id.
\textsuperscript{135} Id.
\textsuperscript{136} Id.
\textsuperscript{137} James Apa Gumuna, \textit{Miner killed in cross-fire}, THE NATIONAL (PNG), Jan. 2, 2008 (on file with Clinic). The article was sent to Barrick for comment, but the Clinic received no response regarding this incident.
\textsuperscript{138} Id.
\textsuperscript{139} Id.
\textsuperscript{140} Autopsy Report, Porgera Hospital at Paiam (2007) (see Appendix C: Medical and Police Reports).
\textsuperscript{141} Id.
\textsuperscript{142} Interviews PNG #231 (2009); PNG #240 (2009); PNG #251 (2009); PNG #252 (2009). \textit{See also} Autopsy Report, Porgera Hospital in Paiam (Nov. 30, 2007) (see Appendix C: Medical and Police Records).
\textsuperscript{143} Interview PNG #240 (2009).
\textsuperscript{144} Interview PNG #251 (2009) (”group of about ten”); \textit{see also} Interviews PNG #240 (2009) (”[W]e were nine or ten men in the group”); PNG #252 (2009) (”around ten of us”).
\textsuperscript{145} Interviews PNG #231(2009); PNG #240 (2009); PNG #251 (2009); PNG #252 (2009).
guard eventually called for additional security. Vehicles soon appeared on the road outside the mine’s gate. Though the witness accounts differ slightly on the number of vehicles and gunmen, they consistently report that men from the vehicles opened fire on the group and killed the young man. One witness stated, “I saw him get shot and fall to the ground. They hit him right above his nose, in his forehead. He yelled ‘I’m hit’ and fell to the ground.” The subsequent autopsy report revealed that the victim had died of a gunshot wound to the head.

The witnesses noted that after the incident, the police had conducted some interviews, but it did not appear that they had done a thorough investigation. One witness stated, “[T]he police came to mediate the peace. They promised to help investigate, but they did not. The company police and state police have done no investigation.” A second witness recalled that after the incident, he was interviewed by the police but to his knowledge, no further investigation occurred. He explained: “We also complained to the [PJVI] Community Affairs Department. We made a verbal complaint . . . . They said they would refer the issue to the mine administration, but nothing happened after that.” A third witness remembered that after the shooting, “The police asked how the incident happened . . . . No one from the company ever came to ask what happened.” A fourth witness said that he was never interviewed at all.

Interviewing all available witnesses is critical in assessing whether or not an incident involved necessary and proportionate use of force by security personnel. This incident in particular highlights the need for investigations to sort through witnesses’ varying reports and ascertain the security guards’ recollections. Determining the reliability of witnesses is also an important part of such assessments. A few witnesses to this incident stated that men in their group were intoxicated and that some of them were carrying bush-knives. There were also conflicting reports about whether the young man had thrown a rock at the guard or fought with the guard, and whether the group threw rocks at the security vehicles.

In addition to the above three shootings, as well as others, the research team has documented numerous accounts of deaths in which individuals were crushed by falling rocks inside the mine pit. A local law enforcement officer recalled a post-mortem report from 2007 regarding the
death of a male in his 30s whose bones were smashed by a falling rock.\textsuperscript{163} Another post-mortem report obtained from the Porgera Hospital revealed that a 24-year-old male was crushed to death by a rock inside the mine site in October 2008.\textsuperscript{164} In addition, a witness reports that a 30-year-old miner was crushed by a rock in the mine pit sometime around November of 2007.\textsuperscript{165}

Furthermore, the research team documented additional accounts where individuals reported witnessing PJV security personnel intentionally pushing rocks onto individuals. Two witnesses stated that a 25-year-old small-scale miner was crushed to death by falling rocks in the mine pit on August 25, 2008.\textsuperscript{166} One witness recalled that he and the victim were in the mine pit and three PJV personnel were above them.\textsuperscript{167} He explained:

   I saw the three security guards above us push an enormous stone over onto us. They gave us no signal as to what they were doing. [The victim] tried to run for cover, but was overtaken by the rocks. He was crushed by a large rock. I ran for cover, but was injured by the stones. My other companion [not the victim] was also hurt badly—his limb was smashed.\textsuperscript{168}

While these deaths may be accidental, all deaths in the mine site warrant a thorough and impartial investigation.

International law protects the “inherent right to life.”\textsuperscript{169} It prohibits arbitrary killings by state security forces.\textsuperscript{170} State security agents must use force “only when strictly necessary and to the extent required for the performance of their duty.”\textsuperscript{171} There is an exceptionally high standard for the use of lethal force by state actors.\textsuperscript{172} Where excessive force is used, as some of the facts above may indicate, there is a violation of the right to life. Insofar as PJV security personnel have become state actors by taking on the policing functions of the state, and because many of them are government police reservists, they may have violated international law.

\footnotesize{(male died in August 2008). See also Post Mortem Report, Porgera Hospital in Paiam (Oct. 7, 2008) (see Appendix C: Medical and Police Reports).}

\footnotesize{163 Interview PNG #200 (2009).}

\footnotesize{164 Post Mortem Report, supra note 162.}

\footnotesize{165 Interview PNG #210 (2009).}

\footnotesize{166 Interviews PNG #206 (2009); PNG #232 (2009).}

\footnotesize{167 Interview PNG #206 (2009).}

\footnotesize{168 Id.}

\footnotesize{169 PNG is a party to the ICCPR, which includes the “inherent right to life.” ICCPR, supra note 3, at art. 6(1).}


\footnotesize{171 Code of Conduct, supra note 3, at art. 3.}

\footnotesize{172 Code of Conduct, supra note 3, at art. 3, cmt. (a) (“This provision emphasizes that the use of force by law enforcement officials should be exceptional.”). See also Basic Principles, supra note 3, at art. 4 (“Law enforcement officials, in carrying out their duty, shall, as far possible, apply non-violent means before resorting to the use of force. . . . [T]hey may use force . . . only if other means remain ineffective or without any promise of achieving the intended results.”); id. at art. 5(a) (law enforcement shall “act in proportion to the seriousness of the offence.”).}
C. Other Physical Abuses

Although the research team spoke with many individuals about incidents of sexual violence and killings, the majority of the events described by interviewees were related to other forms of physical abuse, which, if proved, would often amount to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or, occasionally, to torture. The team recorded many instances of alleged abuse from 1996 to 2009. Individuals recounted that security personnel often beat individuals with wooden sticks and butts of guns; kicked individuals with safety boots; and punched, slapped, and hosed individuals caught in the mine site. Security officers have also allegedly inflicted harm on individuals in their custody by spraying them with cold water from high-powered water hoses. The majority of the alleged abused victims were male.

One 32-year-old man, who was caught by PJV security personnel in February 2002, shared his experience:

Once security caught me they started hitting me, slapping me in the face, punching me in the face, kicking me in the sides of my stomach, and hitting me with their gun barrels in the top of the back. After being hit several times I passed out. They would keep on telling me to wake up only to hit me again. This happened several times. . . . They also put me in handcuffs. Two men grabbed me and threw me in the car. In the car, they sat in the seats, and I lay on the floor. They kept punching me, they didn't have the room to kick me or hit me with their gun barrels. . . . When I got [to the PJV lock-up] one person grabbed the hose and sprayed me with cold water. The hose was very powerful. It was very painful.

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173 See, e.g., Interviews PNG #5 (2006) (male victim kicked; chained to hospital bed); PNG #6 (2006) (victim beaten with wooden stick in 1996); PNG #16 (2006) (male victim beaten with belt in 2004); PNG #22 (2006) (nineteen-year-old male was kicked, punched, hit with the butt of a gun, shocked with a "power stick," and hosed in April 2004; kicked and hosed while naked with seven others in December 2005); PNG #23 (2006) (victim caught, beaten, and hosed by PJV security personnel on six occasions); PNG #26 (2006) (victim kicked in February 2003); PNG #29 (2006) (32-year-old male was beaten or hosed six separate times); PNG #34 (2006) (female repeatedly kicked with boots, punched in the eye, and hosed with a high-powered water hose in 2005); PNG #48 (2006) (female beaten in 2006); PNG #50 (2006) (four male victims beaten several times beginning in 1999); PNG #65 (2006) (approximately eighteen-year-old male hit on the head and kicked by PJV security on August 27, 2006); PNG #71 (2006) (male victim kicked and beaten with butt of gun on February 2, 2002 by security at dump); PNG #72 (2006) (ex-guard kicked and punched in security office in February 1999); PNG #97 (2006) (female victim beaten by security in 2005 while in Warakari); PNG #214 (2009) (34-year-old male beaten in February 2009); PNG #227 (2009) (approximately eight-year-old boy beaten with butt of gun in January 2009); PNG #229 (2009) (former security guard attested to beatings); PNG #242 (2009) (witness to January 2009 incident where boy was beaten in dump). See supra note 52 for incidents where alleged rape victims were beaten.


175 See supra Part III.A for a discussion of beatings that accompanied the gang rape of women.

176 Interview PNG #71 (2006).
One nurse stated in an August 2006 interview that many of her patients had privately told her that their injuries were from beatings by security guards.\footnote{Interview PNG #58 (2006).} Medical reports also reveal injuries occurring inside the mine site.\footnote{Interview PNG #229 (2009).}

Interviews with security personnel revealed that this type of abuse has usually been committed in response to trespassing and illegal mining at the PJV, when individuals entered the mine to search for debris for gold extraction. One former security guard explained that, when he worked there in the 1990s, guards caught trespassers and would often beat them with belts and spray them with water hoses.\footnote{Interview PNG #94 (2006).} Another former security guard noted during an August 2006 interview, "When we hold illegal miners we will badly beat them, make them carry heavy rocks and make them stand on one leg. We will hit them, punch them, kick them, [and] hit them with our guns."\footnote{Interview PNG #47 (2006).} Finally, an active security guard added in a 2006 interview that they would use their boots to "kick whoever comes to the waste dump—man, woman, [or] child."\footnote{Interview PNG #74 (2006); PNG #94 (2006); PNG #101 (2006) ("Supervisors tell us to hose the illegal miners as punishment for being criminals."); PNG #24 (2006) (supervisors instructed guards to beat people and kick with their boots).}

Interviews with security personnel suggest that the PJV has at times encouraged this type of response. Several security guards explained that they received direct instructions to use such force.\footnote{Interview PNG #229 (2009).} One guard stated during an August 2006 interview that he was verbally instructed by his supervisor to beat miners if he caught them.\footnote{Interview PNG #94 (2006).} Another explained in August 2006 that his supervisors specifically encouraged high powered hosings of detained miners, saying, "[The supervisors] tell us that if we spray [illegal miners], they will feel scared and maybe next time won’t do illegal activities."\footnote{Interview PNG #47 (2006).} Some of the security personnel interviewed felt that these abuses were justified by the trespassing of the small-scale miners.\footnote{Interview PNG #74 (2006).} Other mine security personnel said that they have received instructions that they should not beat people that they capture, potentially indicating a shift in supervisor practice or company policy from 2005 or 2006.\footnote{Interview PNG #229 (2009).} However, as previously described, local residents continue to allege that PJV security personnel often employ violence.

In interviews with the research team, local police officers reported that trespassers brought to the police station by PJV security personnel had been injured, some badly. An officer at a police station near the mine stated in 2009, "Sometimes [the trespassers] are beaten up... I can see... [they]... [are]... [injured]... [by]... [the]... [security]... [guards]."\footnote{Interview PNG #11 (2006); PNG #101 (2006).}
their wounds, blood running down their faces, or swollen legs and hands, scratches.\footnote{187} He estimated that about two of the approximately 20 individuals who were arrested every month had been beaten.\footnote{188} Another police officer reported that every month, five or six individuals who were brought into the police station, showed signs of having been beaten, but only two or three of them would make complaints.\footnote{189} He added that, every month, two or three of these individuals have to be taken to the hospital for medical treatment.\footnote{190} According to these police officers, some individuals made complaints about the way they had been treated by PJV security guards, but most of the injured persons have not done so.\footnote{191} One of the officers also noted that there may have been many with injuries that he never noticed.\footnote{192}

Despite the widespread awareness that individuals being handed over to the police frequently exhibited signs of physical abuse, local police officials admitted that they had rarely, if ever, acted upon complaints by individuals in their custody.\footnote{193} One police officer reported, “Sometimes the victims themselves say they were assaulted. We never take any action. The reservists have the authority and their own investigative unit, and they cover what they have done to the illegal miners. They say they haven’t done anything.”\footnote{194}

The widespread allegations of the use of violence by PJV security personnel, especially the beating and hosing of individuals while in custody, may, if proven, constitute violations of the right to be free from torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.\footnote{195} Further, alleged victims have reported severe pain and suffering caused by PJV mine security. Cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment “should be interpreted so as to extend the widest possible protection against abuses, whether physical or mental.”\footnote{196} As state actors, PJV security officers are prohibited from inflicting such abuse, which according to their own admissions was, at times, undertaken to punish and deter trespassers. It should be noted that international law provides special guarantees for individuals who have been deprived of their liberty, requiring that they be treated humanely and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person.\footnote{197} Many of the descriptions of actions which may constitute torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment occurred while individuals were in the custody of PJV security personnel, thereby also implicating this special protection for detainees.

\begin{footnotes}
187 Interview PNG #216 (2009).
188 Id.
189 Interview PNG #200 (2009).
190 Id.
191 Interviews PNG #200 (2009); PNG #216 (2009).
192 Interview PNG #200 (2009).
193 Interviews PNG #200 (2009); PNG #216 (2009).
194 Interview PNG #200 (2009).
195 PNG is a party to the ICCPR, which prohibits torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. ICCPR, supra note 3, at art. 7. See also Convention against Torture, supra note 102, at art. 1(1). The prohibition against cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment extends to acts that might not meet the specific requirements of torture but still involve state action. Id. at art. 10(1).
196 Code of Conduct, supra note 3, at art. 5, cmt. (c).
197 ICCPR, supra note 3, at art. 10(1) (“All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person.”).
\end{footnotes}
IV. INSUFFICIENT INVESTIGATIONS, PROSECUTIONS, AND PREVENTION

The uncertainty surrounding deaths at the mine was highlighted in 2005, when Prime Minister Michael Somare told Parliament that he wanted information about 29 deaths that had occurred at the mine. He stated that he believed that was too many for one site. "We want to know why they are killing those people, and whether the law allows them to do that," he said.

Despite the widespread acknowledgement of violence at the PJV mine over the past two decades, neither the PJV nor the PNG Government have made sufficient efforts to investigate accounts of abuse related to the mine, to bring alleged perpetrators of human rights violations to account, or to ensure that such violence does not occur in the future. Although there are some cases of investigations by the PJV or the PNG police, they have generally not resulted in transparent and public reports, accountability for perpetrators, or a sufficient reduction of allegations of violence at the mine. Moreover, efforts at the national level to reform police conduct and inquire into allegations of human rights abuses at the mine have yielded minimal benefits.

International human rights law recognizes the right to life and the right to be free from torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. As a party to the ICCPR, the PNG Government has a duty to ensure that the allegations of human rights violations at the PJV mine are adequately investigated and prosecuted. This requires the Government to address potential problems with investigation and prosecution, including lack of resources, obstruction by PJV security personnel, and lack of will by local authorities. The ICCPR further demands that State Parties "adopt such laws or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the [ICCPR]." This requirement also confers on the PNG Government a positive duty to take action to prevent future human rights abuses at the PJV mine.

Investigations, perpetrator accountability, and prevention of future abuses have been inhibited by various factors, including:

- **Unwillingness to investigate.** The PNG police have exhibited a reluctance to thoroughly investigate allegations of abuse at the PJV mine. The close relationship between the two parties raises concerns about an inherent conflict of interest.
- **Obstruction of investigations.** Police officers have claimed that the PJV has impeded investigations by, among other things, denying access to crime scenes, limiting access to witnesses, and tampering with evidence.
- **Alleged victims' fears.** Local residents who have allegedly been the victims of violent acts perpetrated by PJV security personnel have often been reluctant to report these incidents to the police because they feared being prosecuted, intimidated, or otherwise targeted for making such claims. This has been especially true of female rape victims.

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198 *Probe looms for mine deaths, supra* note 105.
199 *Id.*
200 *Id.*
201 *ICCPR, supra* note 3, at arts. 6 - 7.
202 *Id.* at arts. 2(3)(a)-(b).
203 *Id.* at art. 2(2).
• Insufficient action by the PNG Government. Although the Porgera Investigative Committee concluded its investigation into incidents of violence related to the PJV mine in 2006, the PNG Government has not released the Committee's findings, and insufficient action appears to have been taken to deter future incidents.

Unwillingness to Investigate
Many local residents believe that police are unwilling or unable to investigate incidents of violence relating to the mine. Numerous local residents told the research team that the police did nothing after they made a report about violence. The family member of a man shot and killed by PJV security personnel expressed a common sentiment shared by locals, "We didn't pursue the case with the police because we were afraid the police wouldn't do anything." Some local residents assert that the PNG state police cooperate with, and protect, the PJV. Indeed, the close relationship between the two parties, as evidenced by the MOU between the PJV and the RPNGC, raises concerns about a conflict of interest that limits the independence of the parties and their ability to carry out thorough and impartial investigations.

Police officials claim that their investigative efforts have been constrained by limited resources, including a lack of modern vehicles and basic office equipment. The central government has recognized the need to better equip its police force in the Porgera Valley—with vehicles, firearms, computers, and other supplies—to address the security issues presented by the mine and the massive population influx, but as of March 2009, had not yet provided local police with resources they considered to be adequate.

Obstruction of Investigations
Other sources within the police force suggested that criminal investigations into reported killings, rapes, and physical abuse at the mine site have been inhibited by a lack of cooperation or even active obstruction by the PJV. Police have complained that PJV security personnel have required them to ask permission before entering the mine site and that PJV security have often impeded access to witnesses, evidence, and crime scenes within the mine site. For example, one police officer claimed that he could have identified the security officers who were involved in a shooting if he was provided with relevant timesheets, but the PJV refused to provide these.

204 Interviews PNG #205 (2009); PNG #231 (2009); PNG #250 (2009).
205 See, e.g., Interviews PNG #206 (2009); PNG #240 (2009); PNG #251 (2009); PNG #252 (2009).
206 Interview PNG #231 (2009).
207 Interviews PNG #197 (2009) ("Government is supporting the company and not the local community."); PNG #205 (2009) ("Government and PJV as one team. . . . ignoring the concerns of landowners") (2009); PNG #218 (2009) ("The company and the police are one and the same."); PNG #250 (2009) (the local police and the PJV police "are part and parcel of each other.").
208 Interviews PNG #66 (2006) (stated that no vehicles have been received from the Government for eleven years; all photocopying must be done at the PJV); PNG #84 (2006) (photocopying must be done at the PJV).
210 See, e.g., Interviews PNG #66 (2006) (the PJV does not allow police to investigate in the mine site); PNG #84 (2006) (police have to get permission to enter mine site); PNG #200 (2009) (police not allowed to enter mine site, the PJV obstructs access to witnesses and evidence); PNG #216 (2009) (police not allowed to visit crime scene, take pictures, and collect evidence); PNG #255 (2009) (access to mine site delayed); PNG #257 (2009) (denied access to mine site).
Another police officer also alleged that PJV security has not always allowed police vehicles on PJV property, further hampering investigations. A third police officer stated that the mine has not always stopped operations when a death occurs, limiting police access to crime scenes. Members of the police have also stated that they believe that PJV security officers have disturbed crime scenes at the mine site by, for example, removing bodies before police have a chance to investigate. One officer stated, “We are the national police, we can enter any place, but their securities they do not allow us to go in. Only after all of the evidence is destroyed. We are called in late.”

In a crime report obtained by the research team, a local police investigator stated that he was unable to complete the investigation of the shooting death of a fifteen-year-old boy due to a lack of cooperation by PJV officials:

I as being the investigator was trying to carry out the investigation when an expatriate company investigator namely John Murphy [sic] denied assisting me with the photos and any other foreign elements picked up from the scene. To make it worse on my side of the investigation, he also denied providing me the company’s time sheet or duty rooster [sic] of the MS14 [Mobile Squad 14] members concerned on that night. Therefore, the case has been sitting pending till [sic] now.

In a letter to his supervisors, another local police officer expressed concern about his access to crime scenes, witnesses, and evidence related to incidents occurring at the mine:

There are so many deaths at the mine site but we the local police CID [investigators in the Criminal Investigation Department] here at Porgera are not called to the crime scenes at the mine site, especially at the open pit. Deaths [that] occurred at the open pit were only brought to the hospital and we local police CID members only witnessed the post-mortems at the hospital. . . . Some times we are called to the crime scene at the open pit but not . . . to the exact locations of the crime scenes.

Law enforcement personnel interviewed by the research team confirmed that the mine has conducted its own investigations and has sometimes sent its findings directly to the prosecutor without appropriately consulting local police investigators. According to police officers, some PJV investigations have not been carried out in a transparent manner, and in some instances

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211 Interview PNG #216 (2009).
212 Interview PNG #84 (2006).
213 Interview PNG #200 (2009).
214 Interviews PNG #84 (2006); PNG #216 (2009).
215 Interview PNG #216 (2009).
216 See supra Part III.B. (Killings and Deaths).
217 Letter (re: Hindrance In To Police Investigations) (see Appendix C: Medical and Police Reports).
219 Interview PNG #216 (2009).
police investigators have been unaware whether prosecutions have taken place. Although there have been isolated instances where PJV security personnel have been prosecuted for a killing, according to local police officers many deaths have either not been independently investigated or prosecutions have not yet been pursued.

**Alleged Victims’ Fears**

The fear of retribution for reporting crimes also appears to have inhibited the investigation of incidents of violence related to the PJV mine. Several individuals said that they believed the police would fail to act against the perpetrators, and would instead take actions against the victims, such as charging them with trespassing. One resident complained, “Police were no help. We were scared so we didn’t complain to the police.”

Rape victims are particularly unlikely to report incidents to the police. As mentioned above, the stigma attached to rape and the possibility of being charged with trespassing means that some women do not report alleged rapes to the police. Furthermore, past experience has convinced some women that the police will simply do nothing. One woman described:

> I did not go to hospital. I was scared that I might go to a [jail] cell. I stayed home. If I went to the police station, I know that I was going to get nothing. I know that I wouldn’t be getting any help. I’ve seen this happen to others, and I knew nothing would happen.

Indeed, a local police officer confirmed that they have rarely pursued claims of rape by PJV security personnel. According to one police officer interviewed in 2009, the Porgera police did not have any female investigators, a factor likely contributing to the reluctance of women to report rapes. In fact, some local police criminal investigators claimed that they were unaware of rapes occurring in or near the mine. “There is nothing reported like rape at the mine site to us. If there was a rape, we would go and investigate.”

**Insufficient Action by the PNG Government**

The widespread, consistent, and longstanding allegations of severe violations of human rights related to the PJV mine demand attention at the national level, yet the PNG Government has not adequately addressed the alleged patterns of abuse committed by PJV security personnel. In 2005, as the result of significant local pressure, the PNG Government instituted a Porgera Investigative Committee. Based on interviews with individuals with knowledge of the

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220 Interviews PNG #199 (2009); PNG #216 (2009).
221 Interviews PNG #199 (2009); PNG #200 (2009). See also supra notes 204, 205.
222 Interviews PNG #86 (2006); PNG #218 (2009).
223 Interviews PNG #210 (2009); PNG #227 (2009).
224 Interview PNG #85 (2006).
225 See Interviews PNG #2 (2006); PNG #247 (2009). See also Interview PNG #212 (2009) (rape victim imprisoned for seven months for trespassing after reporting rape.)
226 Interview PNG #2 (2006).
227 Interview PNG #200 (2009).
228 Id.
229 Interviews PNG #228 (2009); PNG #255 (2009). See also PNG #216 (2009).
230 Interview PNG #228 (2009).
Committee’s work, the investigations appear to have been limited, narrow, and undertaken over a short time period. The results of the investigations have not been released by the Government, despite the fact that the research was completed by late 2006.

It should be noted that the Government has taken a number of steps to reform the police force. According to a high ranking police official, since 2007, the RPNGC has undertaken an initiative to train law enforcement personnel, including the reservists serving at the PJV mine, on human rights principles and “how to deal with the general public.” The police have also initiated programs to increase cooperation with local community members in law enforcement efforts and to educate the public about the dangers of trespassing and illegal mining. However, these efforts have not addressed the fundamental concerns of local residents relating to the use of violence by PJV security personnel and have not overcome the inadequacy of investigations into alleged human rights abuses.

Lack of Response to Research Team’s Inquiries
The research team has made significant efforts to engage with the PNG Government and Barrick, PJV’s owner and operator, in order to obtain important information about the mine. In 2008 and 2009, the research team sent three letters to the PNG Government, requesting to speak with government officials about the PJV mine and asking for access to relevant documents relating to the mine, including the report of the 2006 Porgera Investigative Committee. These letters have not been answered. In March 2009, the research team was able to arrange meetings with government officials in the Mineral Resources Authority (MRA) and the Office of the Prime Minister. However, these meetings did not result in the production of information relating to incidents of violence at the mine. In fact, an official at the MRA declined to allow his comments during the meeting to be incorporated into the record for the purposes of this report. In addition, a secretary to an official in the Prime Minister’s office indicated that he would not be willing to speak with the team about the Porgera Investigative Committee. Thus, to date, there has been no official response regarding inquiries about the mine.

Over the same time period, the research team sent three letters to Barrick requesting a meeting or phone call, information regarding specific instances of violence, and specific documents relating to the mine. The letters included specific requests for reports on the human and environmental

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231 Interview PNG #260 (2009).
233 Letter from Harvard Law School Human Rights Program to Malcolm Balbuni, Department of Mining (Apr. 15, 2008) (on file with Clinic); Letter from Harvard Law School Human Rights Program to Steven Rafael, Office of the Prime Minister (Nov. 4, 2008) (on file with Clinic); Letter from Harvard Law School Human Rights Program to Philip Samar, Mineral Resources Authority (Nov. 4, 2008) (on file with Clinic).
234 In 2008, the research team called a senior official in the Office of the Prime Minister. The official’s secretary first informed the team that the official was unavailable, and later that he was unwilling to speak with the team about the status of the Porgera Investigative Committee. A subsequent letter to the official did not receive an answer.
235 Interviews PNG #259 (2009); PNG #261 (2009).
236 Letter from Harvard Law School Human Rights Program to Peter Munk, Chairman, Barrick Gold Corporation (Apr. 15, 2008) (on file with Clinic); Letter from Harvard Law School Human Rights Program to Katrina White, Regional Legal Counsel, Barrick Australia Pacific (Nov. 3, 2008) (on file with Clinic); Letter from Harvard Law School to Patrick J. Garver, Executive Vice President and General Counsel (Feb. 28, 2009) (on file with Clinic).
impact of the mine as well as the report of the Porgera Investigative Committee.\textsuperscript{237} Barrick has responded to the letters, but save for information on one incident of violence, has not provided a response about specific killings at or near the mine. Similarly, Barrick has not provided documents relating to security arrangements at the PJV mine.\textsuperscript{238}

\textsuperscript{237} Supra note 236.

\textsuperscript{238} Letter from Katrina White, Regional Legal Counsel, Barrick Australia Pacific to Harvard Law School Human Rights Program (May 14, 2008) (on file with Clinic); Letter from Patrick J. Garver, Executive Vice President and General Counsel to Harvard Law School Human Rights Program (Nov. 19, 2009) (on file with Clinic); Letter from Patrick J. Garver, Executive Vice President and General Counsel to Harvard Law School Human Rights Program (Mar. 18, 2009) (on file with Clinic).
V. BILL C-300 AND ITS IMPORTANCE TO CASES LIKE THE PJV MINE

Bill C-300's stated purpose is "to ensure that corporations engaged in mining, oil or gas activities and receiving support from the Government of Canada act in a manner consistent with... Canada's commitments to international human rights standards." The allegations of abuses by PJV security personnel around the mine as well as the lack of independent investigations of incidents and effective remedies for victims demonstrate the importance of a bill like C-300.

Need for Further Review by Home Country
First, the allegations and information outlined above demonstrate three key areas requiring further review by the Canadian Government: (1) the relationship between the PJV and the PNG Government in order to examine the likely conflict of interest that may be inhibiting investigations; (2) consistent allegations of human rights abuses, including sexual violence, killings, and other physical abuses that warrant independent investigations and appropriate mechanisms for effective remedies; and (3) the lack of sufficient investigation, prosecution, and remedy by the PNG Government of alleged abuses by the PJV and state security forces.

The PNG Government has not met its international obligations to investigate serious allegations of human rights abuses and provide adequate remedies for aggrieved individuals. The failure to investigate is exemplified by the PNG Government's refusal to release the findings of the 2006 Porgera Investigative Committee. When violations are allegedly committed by a foreign corporation and when the host country fails to meet its investigation obligations, there is a clear need for other actors, such as home countries, to fill the void. Canada has an interest in monitoring the activities of its corporate citizens and, especially, ensuring that corporations

239 Corporate Accountability for the Activities of Mining, Oil or Gas Corporations in Developing Countries Act, Bill C-300, at § 3 [hereinafter Bill C-300].
240 See MOU, supra note 25, at § 1 (establishing "the deployment of an agreed number of Reserve Police (who are employees of the PJV)" where the PJV "shall be responsible for all costs and expenses associated with the Reserve Police, made up of authorized PJV employees, including remuneration, training and the provisions of uniforms and equipment."). See also Fly-in/Fly-Out Agreement, supra note 33, Part C.9 (requiring the Government to "increase the number of policemen stationed at Porgera to a minimum of thirty... for the remainder of the life of the Porgera Mine"); MOA, supra note 32, at 11 (providing that the government "increase reserve police to numbers sufficient to provide effective support to full-time police officers stationed at Porgera."); Annexure A, supra note 27, at E (providing that the Government "increase the police staffing level at Porgera... once the new police station and associated housing now being constructed with funds provided jointly by [the PJV] and the State is completed" and stating that "[the PJV] will assist, to an extent to be agreed, in funding the stationing of a Mobile [Police] Squad at Porgera on a permanent basis.").
241 The research team has documented several incidents of sexual violence, including rape, by PJV security personnel against women inside the mine site. In interviews with current and former PJV security guards, several confirmed that numerous women were raped. See Interviews, supra note 50.
242 PJV security personnel have allegedly killed individuals in and around the mine on multiple occasions by means of shootings or pushing rocks onto individuals. See Interviews supra notes 107, 113.
243 The research team documented numerous instances of alleged abuse, where PJV security personnel allegedly regularly beat individuals with wooden sticks, butts of guns, punches, slaps, and kicks with safety boots. See Interviews supra note 173.
244 The results of the investigation by the Porgera Investigative Committee have not yet been released by the Government, despite the fact that the research was completed by late 2006. Many local residents believe that police are unwilling or unable to investigate incidents of violence relating to the mine. See Interviews supra notes 204, 205. Police officials cite limited resources and the PJV's lack of cooperation in investigation as reasons investigations have been inhibited. See Interviews supra notes 208, 210.
receiving Canadian Government support are not violating international human rights law. Bill C-300 would provide a mechanism for reviewing serious allegations such as those raised in this submission.

**International Human Rights Law Provides Clear Standards**

Second, Bill C-300 and international human rights law provide clear and manageable guidance regarding an inquiry into a situation like the one at the PJV mine.\(^{245}\) As discussed above, the allegations of violence at the mine, if proven, implicate the right to life and prohibitions on cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment and torture, including rape.\(^{246}\) As outlined in sections III.A-C, international human rights law clearly prohibits gang rape, torture, and the arbitrary deprivation of life. These rights are absolute and may never be abrogated.

The important factual and legal question that arises with respect to some of the accounts described above, however, is whether the use of force by a particular security guard constituted torture or a violation of the right to life, or, rather, whether force was lawfully used in defense of property or life. In such cases, international law also provides clear legal guidance on the type and degree of force that may be used.

- Bill C-300 specifically identifies the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights as a source of guidance.\(^{247}\) The Voluntary Principles in turn reference two important documents: the U.N. Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials (Code of Conduct) and the U.N. Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials (Basic Principles).\(^{248}\) Together, these documents provide clear standards by which a monitoring body may examine allegations like those outlined in this brief.

The U.N. documents offer precise standards for assessing the conduct of PJV security personnel. Both the Code of Conduct and Basic Principles apply to law enforcement officials, defined as “all officers of the law, whether appointed or elected, who exercise police powers, especially the powers of arrest or detention.”\(^{249}\) The Police Reservists and Mobile Police Squads, as government police officials exercising state policing functions of arrest and investigation, are law enforcement officials as defined by the Code of Conduct and Basic Principles. Further, by

\(^{245}\) In § 5(2), Bill C-300 offers that the relevant evaluative guidelines, which are to be promulgated, will be: “(b) the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights; (c) human rights provisions that ensure corporations operate in a manner that is consistent with international human rights standards; and (d) any other standard consistent with international human rights standards.” Bill C-300, supra note 239, at §§ 5(2)(b)-(d).

\(^{246}\) See supra Parts III.A. (Sexual Violence), III.B. (Killings and Deaths) and III.C. (Other Physical Abuses).

\(^{247}\) Bill C-300, supra note 239, at § 5(2)(b) (“The guidelines shall incorporate: ... the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights”).

\(^{248}\) First, the Voluntary Principles state: “In their consultations with host governments, Companies should take all appropriate measures to promote observance of applicable international law enforcement principles, particularly those reflected in the U.N. Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials and the U.N. Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms.” Second, the Voluntary Principles state: “Private security should act in a lawful manner. They should exercise restraint and caution in a manner consistent with applicable international guidelines regarding the local use of force, including the U.N. Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials and the U.N. Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials. ...” The Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights 4-5, http://www.voluntaryprinciples.org/files/voluntary_principles.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2009).

\(^{249}\) Code of Conduct, supra note 3, at art. 1, cmt. (a).
paying and supervising these officials, the PJV has assumed a state function, namely policing. Under both UN documents, the Police Reservists and Mobile Police Squads are required to respect and protect human rights. Finally, even those PJV security personnel who may not be state actors should be held to Barrick’s internal security standards, which are based on the Voluntary Principles.

The Code of Conduct stipulates that law enforcement officials may use force “only when strictly necessary and to the extent required for the performance of their duty.” Thus, the Code of Conduct allows for the use of force only in “exceptional” cases and as a last resort. In numerous documented incidents, PJV security personnel have allegedly resorted to the use of force against unarmed trespassers, including women. Allegations of shootings of trespassers, as well as beatings and hosings of those already in custody, raise serious concerns about whether the force being employed by PJV security personnel was both “necessary” and “proportionate” as required by international law. Moreover, when the use of force is “unavoidable,” the Basic Principles provide that law enforcement must “exercise restraint” and act in a manner so as “to minimize damage and injury, and to preserve human life.” Even when locals threw rocks or were present in large numbers, incidents where firearms were used must still be measured against these standards. In those cases, for example, where an individual was shot in the back, or shot from a significant distance, serious doubts are raised about whether force was lawfully used. In addition, law enforcement officials, including PJV security personnel, have a duty to give a clear and advanced warning of the intent to use firearms. Moreover, whenever security personnel use firearms, a report should be promptly made to appropriate supervisors and state authorities. Based on the information available to the research team, it appears that PJV

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250 See MOU, supra note 25, at § 1 (establishing “the deployment of an agreed number of Reserve Police (who are employees of the PJV)” where the PJV “shall be responsible for all costs and expenses associated with the Reserve Police, made up of authorized PJV employees, including remuneration, training and the provisions of uniforms and equipment.”).

251 Code of Conduct, supra note 3, at art. 2 (“In the performance of their duty, law enforcement officials shall respect and protect human dignity and maintain and uphold the human rights of all persons.”).


253 Code of Conduct, supra note 3, at art. 3, cmt. (a) (“This provision emphasizes that the use of force by law enforcement officials should be exceptional.”). See also Basic Principles, supra note 3, at art. 4 (“Law enforcement officials, in carrying out their duty, shall, as far as possible, apply non-violent means before resorting to the use of force . . . . They may use force . . . . only if other means remain ineffective or without any promise of achieving the intended result.”); id. at art. 5(a) (law enforcement shall “act in proportion to the seriousness of the offence.”).

254 Code of Conduct, supra note 3, at art. 3, cmt. (a).

255 Basic Principles, supra note 3, at art. 4.

256 Id. at art. 3; Basic Principles, supra note 3, at art. 5(a).

257 Basic Principles, supra note 3, at arts. 5(a)-(d); id. at art. 9 (“[I]ntentional lethal use of firearms may only be made when strictly unavoidable in order to protect life.”).

258 Id. at art. 8 (“Exceptional circumstances such as internal political instability or any other public emergency may not be invoked to justify any departure from these basic principles.”). See also Code of Conduct, supra note 3, at art. 5.

259 Basic Principles, supra note 3, at art. 10 (“[L]aw enforcement officials shall . . . give a clear warning of their intent to use firearms, with sufficient time for the warning to be observed, unless to do so will unduly place [them] at risk or would create a risk of death or serious harm to other persons.”). See also id. at art. 11(e).

260 Id. at art. 6 (“Where injury or death is caused by the use of force and firearms by law enforcement officials they shall report the incident promptly to their superiors.”); Code of Conduct, supra note 3, at art. 3(e) (“In every instance in which a firearm is discharged, a report should be made promptly to the competent authorities.”).
security personnel have failed in their duty to submit such prompt reports to the Police Station Commissioner.

Furthermore, Bill C-300’s incorporation of the Voluntary Principles provides guidance for evaluating a company’s conduct with regard to investigations of alleged abuses.\textsuperscript{261} The Voluntary Principles state that companies should “record and report any credible allegations of human rights abuses,” “urge investigation”, and cooperate with local investigations into uses of force.\textsuperscript{262} In addition, the Voluntary Principles urge that matters involving the use of force by private security be referred to local authorities, and that disciplinary action be taken where appropriate.\textsuperscript{263} The existence of the MOU and the allegations described in this report raise concerns about Barrick’s independence from the PNG Government, and therefore its ability to comply with these commitments. The PJV has not demonstrated a commitment to facilitate, assist, or promote good faith investigations by neutral parties into allegations of grave human rights abuses related to the operation of the PJV mine. For example, reports indicate that PJV personnel have obstructed the access of state investigators to crime scenes and witnesses.\textsuperscript{264} While the PJV has claimed that it has conducted its own investigations, the findings of these investigations have not been publicly released and it remains unclear whether alleged perpetrators are appropriately disciplined or prosecuted in all cases.\textsuperscript{265}

Bill C-300 would help provide for independent review of credible complaints when host countries such as PNG have failed to investigate. Years of consistent allegations at the PJV mine demonstrate the need for the creation of monitoring mechanisms that utilize impartial third parties to assess compliance with international standards. Bill C-300 creates such a mechanism, and is an important step toward ensuring that Canadian corporate citizens comply with fundamental human rights obligations.

\textsuperscript{261} Bill C-300, \textit{supra} note 239, at § 5(2)(b).
\textsuperscript{262} Voluntary Principles, \textit{supra} note 248, at 5-6.
\textsuperscript{263} \textit{Id.} at 6.
\textsuperscript{264} \textit{See supra} note 210 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{265} \textit{See supra} notes 219-21 and accompanying text.
Appendix A: Mine Visuals
THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF PAPUA NEW GUINEA

- and -

PLACER (PNG) PTY. LIMITED
HIGHLANDS GOLD PROPERTIES PTY. LIMITED
RGC (PAPUA NEW GUINEA) PTY. LIMITED
A JOINT VENTURE

MINING DEVELOPMENT CONTRACT

FOR THE
PORGERA PROJECT
ENGA PROVINCE
PAPUA NEW GUINEA

Certified as a true copy of the original (incorporating all amendments to date).

D.M. Munro,
Secretary.
Highlands Gold Company.

APRIL 3, 1989
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APPENDICES

A. Copy submission letter accompanying proposal for development.

B. Copy of Minister's letter notifying National Executive Council's approval of proposal for development.

C. Form of Special Mining Lease.

SCHEDULES

1. Description of Goods.
THIS CONTRACT is made this 28th day of May 1979 between:

(4) THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF PAPUA NEW GUINEA (hereinafter called the "State"); and

(2) PLACER (PNG) PTY. LIMITED (hereinafter called "Placer"), HIGHLANDS GOLD PROPERTIES PTY. LIMITED (hereinafter called "Highlands Gold") and RGC (PAPUA NEW GUINEA) PTY. LIMITED (hereinafter called "RGC PNG") each of which is a company incorporated in Papua New Guinea, the registered office of Placer and Highlands Gold being c/- Blake Dawson Waldran, Mogorou Moto Building, Champion Parade, Port Moresby and the registered office of RGC PNG being c/- Coopers & Lybrand, Mogorou Moto Building, Champion Parade, Port Moresby (Placer, Highlands Gold and RGC PNG being hereinafter collectively called "the Joint Venturers").

WHEREAS

A. Commercial deposits of minerals have been discovered in the area of the Prospecting Authority (as hereinafter defined).

B. The Joint Venturers have carried out the Feasibility Study (as hereinafter defined) on the basis of which they concluded that development of a commercial mining project in the area of the Prospecting Authority should proceed.

C. There are annexed hereto a copy of Placer's letter of submission on behalf of the Joint Venturers for approval of a proposal for development and of the Minister's letter notifying the Joint Venturers of the approval of the National Executive Council of their submission marked with the letters "A" and "3" respectively.

D. The Joint Venturers have applied for the Special Mining Lease (as hereinafter defined) and other leases, licences, rights, permits, easements and grants as identified in the Approved Proposal for Development (as hereinafter defined).

E. Development of a commercial mining project in the area of the Prospecting Authority will be of major economic significance to the people of Papua New Guinea.

F. The State wishes, subject to the provisions of recital G hereof, to ensure that the development of the commercial deposits of minerals will secure the maximum benefit for, and adequately contribute to the advancement and the social and economic welfare of, the people of Papua New Guinea, including the people in the vicinity of the Joint Venturers' operations, in a manner consistent with their needs and the protection of the environment.
C. The State wishes to encourage the development of the mining and processing operations upon terms and conditions which, it is anticipated at the time of the execution of this Contract, will secure maximum benefits for the people of Papua New Guinea and secure an appropriate return on investment commensurate with the risks involved to the Joint Venturers.

D. The State and the Joint Venturers have agreed upon a number of matters which are set out in this Contract and wish the matters agreed upon to be an enduring arrangement of national interest.

E. The State and the Joint Venturers pursuant to the Mining Equity Agreement (as hereinafter defined) have agreed that the State may elect to acquire up to a ten percent participating interest in the Project (as hereinafter defined).
IN WITNESS WHEREOF this Contract has been duly executed by the parties on the day of

SIGNED for and on behalf of the
INDEPENDENT STATE OF PAPUA NEW
GUINEA by IGNATIUS KILAGE, G.C.M.G.,
Governor-General, acting
with and in accordance with the
advice of the National Executive
Council in the presence of:

[Signature]

Governor-General

THE COMMON SEAL of PLACER (P.N.G.)
PTY LIMITED was hereunto affixed by
authority of the Board of Directors
in the presence of:

[Signature]

Director

[Seal]

Secretary

THE COMMON SEAL of HIGHLANDS GOLD
PROPERTIES PTY. LIMITED was hereunto
affixed by authority of the Board
of Directors in the presence of:

[Signature]

Director

[Seal]

Secretary

THE COMMON SEAL of RGC (PAPUA NEW
GUINEA) PTY. LIMITED was hereunto
affixed by authority of the Board
of Directors in the presence of:

[Signature]

Director

[Seal]

Secretary
I, IGNATIUS KILAGE, G.C.M.G., Governor-General of the Independent State of Papua New Guinea (hereinafter called "the State") by virtue of the powers conferred on me by the Mining Act, Chapter No. 195 (hereinafter called "the Act") and in accordance with the Mining Development Contract between the State and Placer (PNG) Pty. Limited, Highlands Gold Properties Pty. Limited, and RGC (Papua New Guinea) Pty. Limited dated the day of 1989, (hereinafter called "the Contract") and all other powers me enabling,

HEREBY GRANT to Placer (PNG) Pty. Limited, Highlands Gold Properties Pty. Limited and RGC (Papua New Guinea) Pty. Limited (hereinafter called "the Joint Venturers" which expression shall include their respective successors and assigns) a SPECIAL MINING LEASE (hereinafter called the "Special Mining Lease") over

(i) all mines, veins, seams, lodes and deposits of gold and silver as are contained in, on, or under that piece of land, being the whole of the land described in the attached description and delineated on the Plan annexed hereto and signed by me for the purpose of identification (hereinafter called the "Land"). AND

(ii) such other minerals as are combined in the Land with such gold or silver in such a way that they must necessarily be mined in the mining of such gold or silver in, on or under the said Land, AND

(iii) all limestone, clay minerals, sand, gravel and coarse aggregate in, on or under such Land for use in the development of facilities and infrastructure on the said Land or for such other use or purpose as the Minister responsible for the Act may, from time to time, approve in writing.

with the right and liberty to use the said land for the mining of such gold, silver, minerals, limestone, clay minerals, sand, gravel and coarse aggregate herein mentioned and for such other purposes as may be necessary or desirable for, or ancillary to, such mining including (without limiting the generality of the foregoing) the construction, use and maintenance of all facilities and infrastructure contemplated by the Approved Proposal for Development (as defined in the Contract) as being located thereon.

To hold the said mines, veins, seams, lodes and deposits for a term of thirty years from the date of publication in the National Gazette of the Notice of this grant with the right to variation or renewal of this Special Mining Lease as provided in the Contract and the Act.

YIELDING and paying therefor a rent of K10 per hectare per annum and paying the royalty on mine products as provided in the Act or such other legislation which may be substituted therefor and

UPON AND SUBJECT TO the provisions of the Contract, the Act and any regulations thereto and the following terms and conditions:

1. Without limiting the obligations imposed on the Joint Venturers by the Act, the Joint Venturers shall compensate the owners of private land which is located within the boundaries of this Special Mining Lease in accordance with the Act and any agreement between the Joint Venturers and the owners of such land, as the case may be.

2. The Joint Venturers shall provide the Department of Minerals and Energy with six monthly reports on any exploration activity carried out on the Land.

3. The Joint Venturers shall construct or provide improvements on the Land, substantially as specified in the Approved Proposal for Development, or as otherwise agreed from time to time between the Joint Venturers and the State.

4. The Joint Venturers shall not, without the consent of the State, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld, use the Land for any purpose other than that for which it was granted pursuant to the Contract, the Act and the Approved Proposal for Development.

5. This Special Mining Lease, or any renewal thereof, shall terminate on either the expiration of its term or the termination of the Contract whichever occurs first.

6. The Joint Venturers shall use their best efforts to accommodate traditional land uses to the degree that such uses are consistent with efficient and safe mining practices and are compatible with the performance of the Joint Venturers' obligations under the Contract.
7. If the Joint Venturers fail to comply with a requirement of the Minister pursuant to Section 79(3) of the Act, the Minister may resume, without compensation, the area of leased Land specified in the requirement.

DATED AT PORT MORESBY this 28th day of May 1989.

SIGNED FOR AND ON BEHALF OF THE
INDEPENDENT STATE OF PAPUA NEW
GUINEA by INGNATIUS KILAGE, G.C.M.G., Governor-General, acting with and in accordance with the advice of the National Executive Council in the presence of

[Signature]

[Signature]

9 May 1989

The Secretary
Department of Mines and Energy
PO Box 352
Konedobu
Papua New Guinea

Dear Mr. Pearson

RE: PORGERA PROJECT - PROPOSAL FOR DEVELOPMENT

This letter and the documents listed herein comprise the proposal for development of the Porgera Gold Mine at Porgera in the Enga Province. Two copies of the aforementioned documents, signed on behalf of the Porgera Joint Venture (the "Joint Venturers") for the purposes of identification, accompany this letter. We ask that one copy of each document be signed by the Minister for Mines & Energy (the "Minister") for the purposes of identification and returned with the Minister's letter notifying the Joint Venturers of the National Executive Council's approval of their proposal. The documents are:-

(1) Porgera Project Feasibility Study

A feasibility study dated May, 1988 comprising the following:-

(a) Volume 1 - Geology
(b) Volume 2 - Mining
(c) Volume 3 - Metallurgy
(d) Volume 4 - General Matters
(e) Volume 5 - Cost Estimates
(f) Volume 6 - Summary

It should be noted that, as a result of further exploration conducted since the preparation of the feasibility study, further minable ore reserves have been identified. The effect of this will be to extend the life of the mine described in the feasibility study well beyond the 19 year life projected in the study.
Any contribution of funds sought from the Joint Venturers shall be provided from the Community Grant.

2. Subject to the fish being available at reasonable prices, the Joint Venturers will periodically purchase fish caught from Lake Murray to serve to their employees residing at construction camps and the Suyan townsite.

E

LAW AND ORDER

1. The State will increase the police staffing level at Porgera to 13 officers once the new police station and associated housing now being constructed with funds provided jointly by the Joint Venturers and the State is completed.

2. The Joint Venturers will assist, to an extent to be agreed, in funding the stationing of a Mobile Squad at Porgera on a permanent basis.

F

EMPLOYEES COMMUTING

The Joint Venturers agree to undertake measures to minimise employee commuting by air other than for commencement and termination of employment, recreation leave, emergency leave, compassionate leave, sick leave and the conduct of normal Joint Venture business, by the seventh anniversary of the signing of the Mining Development Contract. To reduce commuter activities as far as reasonably practicable in the interim, the Joint Venturers agree:-

1. to include in all advertisements for operations employees the following information:-

   (a) that accommodation will be provided for married employees who desire to have their families reside at Suyan or any other townsite developed by the Joint Venturers, provided that the employee has completed a minimum probationary period of 6 months and has a salary level equivalent to Grade 12 or above (subject to periodic review by the Joint Venturers).
(b) that annual leave airfares will be provided for all family members to their place of recruitment.

2. (a) subject to qualifications and experience, to give preference to applicants for employment who wish to reside at Porgera.

(b) where financial assistance is offered to Joint Venture employees to acquire or build their own house, to offer such assistance for those wishing to do so at Porgera on significantly more favourable terms.

3. to provide detailed reports to appropriate Government Agencies regarding the progress made towards reducing employee commuting activities within 60 days of the third and subsequent anniversaries of the signing of the Mining Development Contract.

The construction of the Project will proceed in accordance with the construction schedule contained in Volume 6 of the Feasibility Study.

We trust this proposal satisfies the requirements of the Department of Minerals and Energy and is given favourable consideration by the National Executive Council.

We will await your earliest advice regarding approval of the Project and the completion of formal documentation.

Yours sincerely

V. V. Botts
PROJECT MANAGER
PORGERA JOINT VENTURE

FLY IN/FLY OUT AGREEMENT
(PAIAIM TOWN DEVELOPMENT)

BETWEEN

THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF
PAPUA NEW GUINEA

THE ENGA PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT

THE PORGERA DISTRICT LANDOWNERS

THE PORGERA LOCAL-LEVEL GOVERNMENT
SPECIAL PURPOSES AUTHORITY

AND

THE PORGERA JOINT VENTURERS
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AGREEMENT

This Agreement is made on this the of 1998

BETWEEN

THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF PAPUA NEW GUINEA (the "State") of the first part; and

THE ENGA PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT (the "Provincial Government") of the second part; and

THE PORGERA DISTRICT LANDOWNERS (the "Landowners" having the meaning given to that term in the Porgera Agreement) of the third part; and

THE PORGERA LOCAL-LEVEL GOVERNMENT SPECIAL PURPOSES AUTHORITY (PDA) of the fourth part; and

PLACER (PNG) LIMITED ("Placer") of the fifth part; and

HIGHLANDS GOLD PROPERTIES LIMITED ("Highlands") of the sixth part; and

GOLDFIELDS PORGERA LIMITED ("Goldfields") of the seventh part; and

MINERAL RESOURCES PORGERA LIMITED ("MRP") of the eighth part; and

OROGEN MINERALS PORGERA LIMITED ("Orogen") of the ninth part

WHEREAS:

A. Under Clause 5 of an Agreement entered into by the State and the Provincial Government and the Landowners on the 12th May, 1989 (the "Porgera Agreement") the State agreed to promote the development of an integrated, well serviced and economically developing township, in Porgera, by ensuring the PJV would actively promote the residence of mine operations personnel in the Porgera area.

B. Under Clause 5 of the Porgera Agreement, the State undertook to ensure the PJV, by the seventh anniversary of the execution of the Agreement would have reduced to an absolute minimum the number of mine operations personnel flying in and out of Porgera, in order to better promote township development, and thus minimise any economic loss to the community due to fly-in/fly-out.
b) To use its best efforts to assist each of the other Parties hereto to promote and ensure the controlled development of Paiam township; and

c) To provide maintenance funding to PDA for Paiam Town on an annual basis in accordance with the rate set for an equivalent urban council.

6 PROJECT FUNDING

a) The State will provide Special Support Grant and Mining Agreement funding through PDA for the Porgera community and the Porgera Valley (which may be presently in arrears) prior to all Parties proceeding with any stage of the Township development. The State will also provide over a period of four consecutive years the sum of K625,000 per year as interest free loans to PADC.

b) To the extent that the Projects referred to in Clause 3 are not funded from IDP funds or under the Tax Credit Scheme or by the individual governmental authority responsible for the project, the State will cooperate with the Provincial Government and PDA so as to ensure the timely provision to PDA of the requisite funding so as to enable the development of Paiam town in accordance with the Town Plan and over the period contemplated by Clause 3.

7 ESTABLISHMENT OF AN URBAN COUNCIL

Upon receipt of a recommendation from the Provincial Government, the State will facilitate the establishment of an Urban Council to administer the affairs of Paiam Township, once the development of the town has been completed in accordance with this Agreement.

8 SPECIAL SUPPORT GRANT AND MINING AGREEMENT PROJECT FUNDS

The State will develop a scheme to have the amount of any government funds (such as the Special Support Grants) due to PDA paid directly to PDA.

9 LAW AND ORDER

The State agrees to the establishment of a Reserve Constabulary establishment of a minimum of 40 personnel, including two females, and also to the provision of a Police Public Relations Officer to carry out Liaison with the Village courts, Community and District Administrator.

The State shall also increase the number of regular policemen stationed at Porgera to a minimum of thirty (30) and maintain at least that number for the remainder of the life of the Porgera Mine; shall ensure that all such policemen
are suitably experienced and shall ensure that all such policemen are rotated on a not more than three year basis. The State will actively promote the reduction of lawlessness and seek to improve law and order on the Highlands Highway within Enga and in the Porgera Valley.

10 RURAL LOCK-UP

The State shall provide funding for staff, maintenance and infrastructure to build, manage and maintain a Corrective Institution, on a site approved by the Provincial Government, PDA and the Landowners, to hold prisoners for a period of up to six months.

11 EMPLOYMENT OF PJV EMPLOYEE FAMILY MEMBERS

The State shall ensure that any family member of any PJV employee, including those of expatriate employees, resident in Paiam shall be able to legally obtain employment in the Porgera Valley. This may require exemptions for visa regulations, which the State will provide.

12 PURCHASE OF ADDITIONAL URBAN LAND

The State will provide funding for completion of an investigation into the additional land required for Paiam Township and will definitely provide funding as required for the purchase or compulsory acquisition of the necessary lands. Payments will be made in line with the compensation rates used for improvements by the PJV and the Valuer-General's assessment of the value of unimproved land.

13 HIGHWAY CORRIDOR

The State will use its best efforts to provide or procure the provision of a corridor along each side of the existing highway between Kairik and the mine site, which will be free from any form of development, other than community infrastructure approved by PDA.

14 RADIO LICENCE

The State will provide a radio licence for a local radio station to be managed by PMC.

15 INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

a) The State accepts and agrees that the development of Paiam Town and the Projects hereinbefore referred to are Relevant Infrastructure for the purposes of Clause 16 of the PSA and the State shall, through its representatives on
i) If a quorum is not present at any meeting of the Monitoring Committee the meeting shall stand adjourned for seven (7) days and at the reconvened meeting the member or members present shall constitute a quorum.

j) The representative of the State or, in his absence, the representative of the Provincial Government shall chair each meeting of the Monitoring Committee and has the casting vote in case of a hung vote.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF this Agreement has been duly executed by the parties on the of 1998.

Signed for and on behalf of the Independent State of Papua New Guinea by:
Sailas Atoare GCMG, K.St.J.
Governor-General, acting with and in accordance with the advice of the National Executive Council in the presence of:

Signed for and on behalf of the Enga Provincial Government by:
The Honourable Peter Ipatas, M.P.,
The Governor of the Enga Province acting with and in accordance with the advice of the Enga Cabinet in the presence of:

Signed for and on behalf of The Porgera District Landowners by the duly elected Chairman of their Association in the presence of:

Witness

Witness

Chairman
The Common Seal of
Porgera Local-Level Government
Special Purposes Authority
was hereunto affixed by the
Chairman in the presence of:

Witness
FRANCIS TOWN
Name

The Common Seal of
Placer (PNG) Limited
was hereunto affixed by
the Authority of the Board of Directors
in the presence of:

Secretary
Dir. R. C. PARKIN
Name

Director
D.W. ZANDER
Name

The Common Seal of
Highlands Gold Properties Limited
was hereunto affixed by
the Authority of the Board of Directors
in the presence of:

Secretary
CHRISTOPHER TRAINER
Name

Director
R.J. BARKER
Name
The Common Seal of Goldfields Porgera Limited was hereunto affixed by the Authority of the Board of Directors in the presence of:

Secretary

P. G. MATHERS

Name

Director

PW CASSIDY

Name

The Common Seal of Mineral Resources Porgera Limited was hereunto affixed by the Authority of the Board of Directors in the presence of:

Secretary

KEVIN YALAPAIN

Name

Signed for and on behalf of Orogen Minerals Porgera Limited by its duly authorized representative:

The Common Seal of Orogen Minerals Porgera Limited was hereunto affixed by the Authority of the Board of Directors in the presence of:

Director

LA TEMU

Name

Secretary

VITALE

Name

Director

CHAMWENI

Name
B-3
INDEPENDENT STATE OF PAPUA NEW GUINEA

AND

PORGERA LANDOWNERS

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT RELATING TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PORGERA GOLD MINE PROJECT

MAY 1989
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THIS AGREEMENT is made on the 12th day of May 1989

BETWEEN the INDEPENDENT STATE OF PAPUA NEW GUINEA and the ENGA PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT.

WHEREAS

(A) The Porgera Joint Venture has applied to the National Government to develop a gold mine at Porgera in the Enga Province, and

(B) The National Government has involved Landowners in the deliberations on the proposals for the development by the Porgera Joint Venture, and

(C) The National Government and the Landowners have had negotiations in relation to matters of concern to the Landowners, and

(D) The National Government has, in recognition of the need for proper administration and development in the Porgera District, agreed to a number of matters which will directly or indirectly assist the Landowners in the District and both parties wish to make the decisions emanating from this an enduring arrangement.

IT IS AGREED AS FOLLOWS:

A. GENERAL

I. DEFINITIONS

"Approved Proposals for Development" shall have the same meaning as in the Mining Development Contract between the Independent State of Papua New Guinea and the Porgera Joint Venture.

"Commencement of Production" means the first date on which gold is produced for sale from the Porgera Mine Project.

"Commencement of Commercial Production" shall have the same meaning as in the Mining Development Contract.

"Community Facilities Grant" means any grant made available by the Porgera Joint Venture for the provision of community facilities in the Porgera District.
"Landowners" means member of any landowning clan which at any time has its origin in and owns land in the Porgera District and includes those persons who own land within the Special Mining Lease area.

"Mining Development Contract" means the agreement executed between the Independent State of Papua New Guinea and the Porgera Joint Venture for the Porgera Mine Project.


"Parties" or "Party" means the parties to this Agreement.

"Porgera District" includes the Porgera and the Paiela Council areas.

"Porgera Joint Venture" means the three companies, Placer (PNG) Pty Ltd., Highlands Gold Properties Pty Ltd and RGC (Papua New Guinea) Pty Ltd, or their respective assigns or successors, which have jointly entered into the Mining Development Contract to develop the Porgera Mine Project.

"Porgera Mine Project" means the mining development approved by National Executive Council over which the Porgera Special Mining Lease has been granted.

"Provincial Government" means the Enga Provincial Government.

"royalty" means the royalty under Section 105 of the Mining Act (Chapter 195) or any amendments to, or provisions succeeding or substituted for, those provisions.

"Special Mining Lease" is the lease granted pursuant to the Mining Act to the Porgera Joint Venture for the Porgera Mine Project.

"Special Mining Lease Landowners" means member of the Tieni, Waiwa, Tuanda, Pulumanini, Angalaine, Mamai and Anga clans of the Porgera District which own land in the Special Mining Lease area.
9. ADMINISTRATION

The National Government undertakes that -

(a) within six months of the execution of this Agreement, it will create, fund and provide housing and office space for twelve additional public service positions, as described in the diagram in Annexure B to this Agreement, to be based in the Porgera District, at least four of which shall be available where necessary to expatriate contract officers.

(b) all public servants in the Porgera District will be paid a special zone allowance comparable to those in existence in other mining areas and consistent with national wage policy

(1b) the National Government will ensure that the Enga Provincial Government creates a third economic zone covering the Porgera District for the better administration and development of that District.

10. LONG TERM ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PLAN

The National Government will make available a consultant for such period as is required to assist the Porgera Development Authority and the Enga Provincial Government in establishing a long term economic development plan for the Porgera District.

11. LAW AND ORDER

The National Government undertakes to -

(a) station an officer of the rank of Inspector at Porgera to be in charge of the Porgera Police Station.

(b) subject to the availability of suitable candidates, increase reserve police to numbers sufficient to provide effective support to full-time police officers stationed at Porgera.

(c) ensure, in conjunction with Enga Provincial Government and with assistance from the Porgera Joint Venture, that the boom-gate remains in place at Mount Maip to regulate the flow of people and goods into Porgera.

(d) upgrade the Mulitaka Police Station within two years of the execution of the agreement.
37.2 The provisions of 37.1 shall be in addition to the consultation provisions relating to the implementation of Supply and Procurement and Training and Localisation provisions in the Mining Development Contract.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF this Agreement has been duly executed by the Parties on the 12th day of May 1989.

SIGNED for and on behalf of the
INDEPENDENT STATE OF PAPUA NEW
GUINEA by the Acting Minister
for Finance and Planning. The
Honourable JOHN GIBENO in the
presence of:

The Honourable RABBIE NAMALIU
PRIME MINISTER

SIGNED for and on behalf of the
LANDOWNING CLANS and SUBCLANS
of the FORGERA SPECIAL MINING
LEASE area

Wasa Aliape : Tiyaní - Wagialo
Ipaia Lara : Tiyaní - Kamimalo
John Kulina : Tiyaní - Lakima
Nixen Magape : Tiyaní - Wuape
Ekale Kangaba : Tiyaní - Akíra
Kimalea Ondalane: Tiyaní - Yagua
Pospi Karip : Waiwa - Lunda
Tapia Karipi : Waiwa - Yaliope
Aiyope Yawane : Tuanda - Yapala
Ambi Kipu : Tuanda - Ulupa
Ekepe Wuambó : Mamai - Kenja
Ikipa Yukui : Mamai - Andopo
Kule Layo : Pulumaini/Ambo-Amu
Peakope Awuakini : Pulumaini/Ambo-Endewa
Pera Itawi : Pulumaini/Ambo-Gai
Pala Teya : Pulumaini/Ambo-Paramba
Andita Keko : Pulumaini/Ambo-Yusa
Jolson Kutato : Angalaini - Piko
Sakarias Kiwali : Angalaini - Diwi
Pawe Menepe : Angalaini - Oyopen
Marakos Tekaipe : Angalai ani - Hulewali
Unjiali Koakalai : Anga - Auga

Witness

23
SIGNED FOR AND ON BEHALF
OF THE FORGERA LOCAL GOVERNMENT COUNCIL
BY:

1. Yaliman Pawe  President
2. Kemben Lenawe  Vice President
3. Jonathan Paraia  Town Councillor
4. Pokoli Pasala  Councillor
5. Peakape Awauakini  Councillor
6. Tindiwi Waonyawe  Councillor
7. Pakitu Pundi  Councillor
8. Amowa Magariri  Councillor
9. Aiyo Anginape  Councillor
10. Porowi Mangen  Councillor

[Signatures]
Note: The original is with the Commissioner, but this copy was typed verbatim from a copy shown to three members of Harvard Law School's International Human Rights Clinic by an official of the police force, who said the copy was the same as the original.

[Page 1 of 9]
Header: Agreement between the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary and the Porgera Joint Venture - 2005

Memorandum of Understanding
between
Porgera Joint Venture
and
Royal PNG Constabulary

[Page 2 of 9]

Independent State of Papua New Guinea

Memorandum of Understanding

In relation to an agreement made between the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary (RPNGC) and the Porgera Joint Venture (PJV).

This Agreement relates to:

a) The deployment of the Reserve Constabulary.
b) The command and control of the Reserve Police.
c) The on-going funding, recruitment and training of the Reserve Police.
d) The establishment of the Reserve Police Dog Unit
e) The conduct of the PJV Reserve Police Training Cell

1. THE COMMISSIONER OF THE POLICE
(Command and Control)

The Commissioner of the Police of the RPNGC authorizes the deployment of an agreed number of Reserve Police (who are employees of the PJV), for the purpose of assisting regular Police in providing a Police service to Enga province, and other such areas as authorized by the Commissioner. The following conditions shall apply:

1.1 The Reserve Police shall in the performance of their duties and responsibilities as members of the RPNGC Reserve Police, come under the command of the Commissioner of Police through the RPNGC Divisional Commander – Highlands.

[Page 3 of 9]
1.2 The Director of Community Policing at Police Headquarters, Konedobu, shall be the liaison officer for the purposes of the administration of the Reserve Police.

1.3 The Police Station Commissioner (PSC), Porgera, shall be responsible for the daily supervision and discipline of the Reserve Police whilst they are performing their duties.

1.4 The Provincial Police Commander, Enga Province, shall be responsible for any initial and ongoing training of the Reserve Police.

1.5 At all times whilst performing their duties as Police Officers, Reserve Police shall be subject to the provisions of the Police Force Act 1998, Police Force Regulations 1998, Constabulary Standing Orders, and other relevant rules and regulations which regular Police are subject to.

1.6 Reserve Police may be vested with such powers of the regular Constabulary as is considered necessary by the Commissioner.

1.7 Reserve Police deployed under this agreement shall be drawn from suitably approved PJV employees, and the approved manpower ceiling shall not exceed 100 members without the express permission of the Commissioner or his authorized designate.

1.8 Reserve Police deployed under this agreement shall not be deployed exclusively to provide for the PJV, but shall be available to provide assistance to the Divisional Commander – Highlands, PPC Enga and the PSC Porgera.

2. **Porgera Joint Venture**

The Porgera Joint Venture undertakes to do the following:

2.1 The PJV shall be responsible for all costs and expenses associated with the Reserve Police, made up of authorized PJV employees, including remuneration, training and the provisions of uniforms and equipment.

2.2 Uniforms and equipment shall conform to the standards and specifications of the RPNGC Reserve Constabulary. [Page 4 of 9]

2.3 In the event of death or disability to a Reserve Police member employed by the PJV, the Porgera Joint Venture shall indemnify the RPNGC from and against all claims by any Reserve Police member or his/her family and dependents, including limitation claims under the provisions of the Worker Compensation Act Chapter 179 and the Police Force Act 1998. The RPNGC will accept no liability, civil or criminal, for any such claim.
2.4 The PJV shall ensure that Reserve Police reports are compiled and dispatched on a monthly basis to the Director of Community Policing, giving manpower details and movements, arrest particulars and vehicle serviceability status.

3. Police Dogs

Guidelines on the establishment and maintenance of a joint dog breeding program and the establishment of a Police Reserve Dog Unit located at the PJV.

3.1 The Commissioner of Police authorizes the establishment of a joint dog breeding program and the establishment of a Police Reserve Dog Unit.

3.2 Advising applicable superiors of activities, the Senior Trainers (Dogs) PJV Asset Protection Department & RPNGC Director of Police Dogs to liaise directly in regard to relevant police dog matters.

3.3 The Senior Trainer (Dogs) PJV Asset Protection Department to raise a monthly Police Dog occurrence and activity report for PJV Asset Protection Department Manager, Director of Community Policing and Director of Police Dogs. Report to cover all police dog activities such as; operations; breeding; deaths disposals; training; allocations etc.

3.4 Subject to standard application requirements forwarded by PJV Asset Protection Manager and approved by the Director of Community Policing and Director Police Dogs, selected PJV Dog Unit Personnel to be trained and sworn in as RPNGC Dog Unit Reservists.

3.5 The Commissioner of police duly recognizes the PJV Dog Unit as a RPNGC Reservist Police Dog Unit for the purpose of the proposed police dog breeding program and assistance with community policing.

3.6 RPNGC and the PJV to purchase dogs for their own particular requirements. RPNGC and the PJV to liaise when purchasing dog from overseas to ascertain if combined purchases can be effected for cost savings and benefit of both parties.

3.7 PJV to provide advice to Director of Police Dogs on applicable market price for potential police dogs and any other relevant information concerning purchase and/or import of dogs.

3.8 Where possible, PJV to assist with provision of facilities at Porgera and expertise in the breeding of police dogs for the RPNGC.

3.9 Initial breeding of dogs to be conducted by the PJV until such time as the Director of Police Dogs is satisfied that RPNGC dog Handlers have gained sufficient specialist knowledge to be capable of conducting a cost effective breeding program at Bomana.
3.10 All dogs directly purchased by RPNGC and PJV shall remain the property of each individual organization unless signed over using an agreed form of release.

3.11 If a mating pair of animals is entirely owned by RPNGC then all pups from the litter shall be the property of the RPNGC. Likewise, if the mating pair is both PJV dogs then all pups shall be the property of the PJV.

3.12 If one breeding animal is owned by RPNGC and one owned by PJV then the litter of pups to be shared equally. The RPNGC shall have the right of first selection of the pups. If the litter is odd in number, the PJV may have the right of utilizing the extra pup. [page 6 of 9]

3.13 For evidence of ownership, all dogs will have an approved microchip inserted subcutaneously at the shoulder. Each microchip has a unique number for easy recognition with a chip scanner. The Senior Trainer (Dogs) PJV Asset Protection Department shall inject the microchip and immediately notify the Director of Police Dogs of the chip number.

3.14 With any dog-breeding program, there can be an expected mortality rate. On average, it is not unusual to lose about 15% [KJM – I think this may be 25%] of pups per litter at birth. In addition to puppy death, we can also expect to lose anywhere from 15% to 40% of dogs per litter due to unexpected injury/illness or, failure to make the standard required of a police dog. All puppy and/or adult dogs deaths to be reported to the Director of Police Dogs.

3.15 Recommendation for disposal of a police dog to be forwarded to the Director of Police Dogs for approval. Methods of disposal to be by euthanasia or, given/sold (using approved release form) to an individual or organization. If approved to sell a rejected police dog, any monies to be channeled back into PJV Asset Protection Dog Unit budget recovery account for the purpose of police dog breeding and/or handler training expenses. Copies of sale receipt and form of release to be forwarded to Director of Police Dogs.

3.16 On humane grounds, the Senior Trainer PJV Asset Protection Department may euthanize any police dog under his care and will send a report to the PJV Asset Protection Manager and Director Police Dogs of any such occurrence at the earliest opportunity (usually within 24 – 48 hours).

3.17 PJV to provide specialist kennel management training to a selected number of RPNGC Dog Handlers. Training to consist of but not restricted to, kennel hygiene, animal nutrition, dog breeding techniques, animal first aid, basic veterinary skills and safe handling of sick/injured dogs.
3.18 Primary training of handlers to be conducted at Porgera. Any training assistance required at other PNG Province field units to be negotiated by PJV Asset Protection Manager and Director of Police Dogs [Page 7 of 9]

3.19 On instruction from the PJV Asset Protection Department Manager, the Senior Trainer (Dogs) shall provide specialist dog advice as required to the Director of Police Dogs and Director of Community Policing.

3.20 On request by the Director of Police Dogs & approval form the PJV Asset Protection Department Manager, the Senior Trainer (Dogs) to visit Bomana for the purpose of providing direct specialist information and/or training as may be applicable from time to time.

3.21 PJV shall ensure that the Reserve Police Dog Unit reports pertaining to joint dog breeding program are compiled and dispatched on a monthly basis to Director Dogs at the National Police Headquarters, on a monthly basis.

4. Training

The Commissioner of Police of the RPNGC recognizes the PJV Reserve Police Unit as an accredited RPNGC Training Cell for the provision of approved training material. The PJV Training Cell will provide agreed training to sworn members of the RPNGC, including regular members, Reserve Police and Auxiliary Police. The following conditions shall apply:

4.1 Training provided to sworn members of the RPNGC will be agreed to in consultation between the Commissioner of Police, Director of Community Policing and the Asset Protection Manager of the Porgera Joint Venture.

4.2 PJV training personnel for any training courses conducted will be sworn members of the RPNGC PJV Reserve Police Unit.

4.3 Costs associated with any training provided to the RPNGC personnel will form a part of discussions and agreement relating to paragraph 4.1 of this document.

4.4 The Porgera Joint Venture bears no outright responsibility for the costs of training regular members of the RPNGC. [Page 8 of 9]

5. Operation and Duration

5.1 This agreement shall take effect from the date of signing and shall remain in force until dissolved by mutual agreement of the parties.
5.2 This agreement may be terminated by either party upon giving ninety (90) days notice in writing of such intention to the other party on the ground that one or both parties have failed to fulfill its obligations under the agreement.

5. Execution

This memorandum is signed and sealed this _____ day of _______ 2005, between the parties herein mentioned.

Signed for and on behalf of the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary

S E. Inguba, CBE, QPM  
Commissioner of the Police  
Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary

(Witness to Sign)

Seal of the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary

Signed for and on behalf of Placer (PNG) Limited, Managers of the Porgera Joint Venture

[Page 9 of 9]

Brad GORDON, Managing Director  
Placer (PNG Limited)

(Witness to Sign)

Seal of Placer (PNG) Limited
Note : L'original est chez le Commissaire, mais le texte qui suit est la transcription textuelle d'une copie montrée à trois membres de l'International Human Rights Clinic de la Harvard Law School par un représentant du service de police, qui a affirmé que la copie était identique à l'original.

[Page 1 de 9]

En-tête : Entente entre la Force constabulaire royale de Papouasie-Nouvelle-Guinée (FCRPNG) et Porgera Joint Venture (PJV) - 2005

Protocole d'entente
entre
Porgera Joint Venture
et
la Force constabulaire royale de Papouasie-Nouvelle-Guinée

[Page 2 de 9]

État indépendant de Papouasie-Nouvelle-Guinée

Protocole d'entente

Visant une entente passée entre la Force constabulaire royale de Papouasie-Nouvelle-Guinée (FCRPNG) et Porgera Joint Venture (PJV).

La présente entente vise
a) le déploiement de la Force constabulaire de réserve,
b) le commandement et le contrôle de la police de réserve,
c) le financement permanent de la police de réserve, du recrutement de ses membres et de leur formation,
d) l'établissement de l'Unité canine de la police de réserve,
e) les activités de la cellule de formation de la police de réserve de PJV.

1. LE COMMISSAIRE DE POLICE
(commandement et contrôle)

The Commissaire de police de la FCRPNG autorise le déploiement d'un nombre convenu d'agents de la police de réserve (qui sont des employés de PJV) afin qu'ils aident les agents de la police régulière à assurer les services de police dans la province d'Enga et dans d'autres régions similaires, avec l'autorisation du Commissaire. Les conditions suivantes s'appliquent.

1.1 Dans l'exercice de leurs attributions en tant que membres de la police de réserve de la FCRPNG, les agents de la police de réserve relèvent du Commandant divisionnaire de la FCRPNG - Highlands, qui relève lui-même du Commissaire de
police
1.2 Le Directeur de la police communautaire, au quartier général de la police, à Konedobu, fait office d'agent de liaison aux fins de l'administration de la police de réserve.

1.3 Le Commissaire du poste de police (CPP) de Porgera assure la supervision quotidienne et la discipline des agents de la police de réserve pendant le service.

1.4 Le Commandant provincial de la police de la province d'Enga, assure la formation initiale puis permanente des membres de la police de réserve.


1.6 Les membres de la police de réserve peuvent être investis des pouvoirs de la Force constabulaire régulière que le Commissaire juge nécessaire de leur conférer.

1.7 Les membres de la police de réserve déployés en vertu de la présente entente sont des employés dûment approuvés de PJV, et leur effectif ne peut excéder 100 membres sans la permission expresse du Commissaire ou du suppléant qu'il désigne.

1.8 Les membres de la police de réserve déployés en vertu de la présente entente ne sont pas déployés uniquement pour les besoins de PJV, mais peuvent être mis à la disposition du Commandant divisionnaire – Highlands, du CPP d'Enga et du CPP de Porgera.

2. **Porgera Joint Venture**

Porgera Joint Venture prend les engagements qui suivent.

2.1 PJV assume la totalité des frais et dépenses occasionnés par la police de réserve – laquelle est composée d'employés autorisés de PJV –, notamment le coût de leur rémunération, de leur formation ainsi que de leurs uniformes et de leur équipement.

2.2 Les uniformes et l'équipement sont conformes aux normes et exigences de la Force constabulaire de réserve de la FCRPNG. [Page 4 de 9]

2.3 Dans l'éventualité du décès ou de l'invalidité d'un membre de la police de réserve à l'emploi de PJV, Porgera Joint Venture assume les réclamations faites à la FCRPNG qui émanent d'un membre de la police de réserve, de sa famille ou des personnes à sa charge, y compris les réclamations faites en vertu des dispositions du chapitre 179 de
2.4 PJV veille à ce que la police de réserve produise un rapport mensuel détaillé sur l'effectif et ses mouvements, sur les arrestations et sur l'état de fonctionnement des véhicules et qu'elle le fasse parvenir au Directeur de la police communautaire.

3. Chiens policiers

Lignes directrices sur l'établissement et le maintien d'un programme conjoint d'élevage de chiens et d'une Unité canine de la police de réserve dans les installations de PJV.

3.1 Le Commissaire de police autorise l'établissement d'un programme conjoint d'élevage de chiens et d'une Unité canine de la police de réserve.

3.2 En tenant leurs supérieurs compétents informés de leurs activités, les Dresseurs principaux (Chiens) du Service de protection des biens de PJV et le Directeur de l'unité des chiens policiers de la FCRPNG se tiennent mutuellement au courant des questions concernant les chiens policiers.

3.3 Le Dresseur principal (Chiens) du Service de protection des biens de PJV fait un rapport mensuel sur les incidents et les activités en rapport avec les chiens policiers au Gestionnaire du Service de protection des biens de PJV, au Directeur de la police communautaire et au Directeur de l'unité des chiens policiers. Le rapport doit décrire toutes les activités relatives aux chiens policiers, comme les opérations; l'élevage; l'élimination des animaux morts; le dressage; les affectations, etc.

3.4 Sous réserve des exigences habituelles à l'égard des demandes, exigences diffusées par le Gestionnaire de la protection des biens de PJV et approuvées par le Directeur de la police communautaire et le directeur de l'Unité des chiens policiers, certains employés de l'Unité canine de PJV [Page 5 de 9] sont formés et assermentés en tant que réservistes de l'Unité canine de la FCRPNG.

3.5 Le Commissaire de police reconnait qu'aux fins du programme d'élevage de chiens policiers ici proposé et de l'aide aux services de police communautaire, l'Unité canine de PJV est une Unité canine de réserve de la FCRPNG.

3.6 La FCRPNG et PJV achètent les chiens nécessaires à leurs besoins respectifs. Quand ils projettent d'en acheter à l'étranger, ils s'en informent mutuellement afin de combiner leurs achats, si possible, de manière à réaliser des économies d'échelle et de conditions mutuellement advantageuses.

3.7 PJV avise le Directeur de l'Unité des chiens policiers du prix courant des chiens pouvant faire de bons chiens policiers et lui communique tout autre renseignement pertinent sur leur achat ou leur importation.

3.8 Quand c'est possible, PJV aide à trouver, à Porgera même, des installations et des compétences aux fins de l'élevage et du dressage des chiens policiers destinés à la FCRPNG.

3.9 Le dressage primaire des chiens est assuré par PJV jusqu'à ce que le Directeur de l'Unité des chiens policiers ait l'assurance que les maîtres-chiens de la FCRPNG ont acquis suffisamment de connaissances spécialisées pour pouvoir appliquer avec succès un programme rentable d'élevage de chiens à Bomana.
3.10 Les chiens achetés séparément par la FCRPNG et PJV demeurent leur propriété respective tant qu’ils ne sont pas échangés au moyen du formulaire convenu par les parties.

3.11 La FCRPNG est seule propriétaire des chiots d’un couple reproducteur lui appartenant. De même, PJV est seul propriétaire des chiots d’un couple reproducteur lui appartenant.

3.12 Quand la FCRPNG et PJV possèdent chacun un des animaux d’un couple reproducteur, ils se partagent également les chiots issus de leur accouplement. La FCRPNG a le premier choix. Quand les chiots de la portée sont en nombre impair, le dernier chiot revient à PJV. [page 6 de 9]

3.13 Tous les chiens ont dans l’épaule une puce électronique sous-cutanée identifiant leur propriétaire. Chaque puce a un numéro unique facile à lire au scanner. La mise en place des puces incombe au Dresseur principal (Chiens) du Service de protection des biens de PJV, qui en communique immédiatement les numéros au Directeur de l’Unité des chiens policiers.

3.14 Quand on élève des chiens, il faut s’attendre à un certain taux de mortalité chez les animaux. En moyenne, quelque 15 p. cent [KJM - je crois que ce taux peut atteindre 25 p. cent] des chiots de chaque portée meurent à la naissance. Outre la mortalité chez les chiots, il faut aussi s’attendre à perdre de 15 à 40 p. cent des chiens de chaque portée à la suite de blessures ou de maladies, impossibles à prévoir, ou de l’incapacité de certains chiens d’acquérir les qualités exigées de tout chien policier. Le Directeur de l’Unité des chiens policiers est informé de chaque mort de chiot ou de chien adulte.


3.16 Pour des raisons humanitaires, le Dresseur principal du Service de protection des biens de PJV peut euthanasier un chien policier dont il a la charge. Le cas échéant, il fait dans les meilleurs délais (habituellement dans les 24 à 48 heures) un rapport au Gestionnaire de la protection des biens de PJV et au Directeur de l’Unité des chiens policiers.
3.17 PJV dispense une formation spécialisée en gestion de chenil aux maîtres-chiens sélectionnés de la FCRPNG. La formation porte notamment sur l'hygiène dans un chenil, la meilleure alimentation pour le chien, les techniques d'élevage du chien, les premiers soins à prodiguer au chien, les rudiments de la médecine vétérinaire et la façon sécuritaire de contrôler les chiens malades ou blessés.
3.18 La formation primaire des maîtres-chiens est dispensée à Porgera. Toute aide à la formation requise dans les unités des autres provinces de la PNG doit être négociée entre le Gestionnaire du Service de protection des biens de PJV et le Directeur de l’Unité des chiens policiers [Page 7 de 9]

3.19 Sur ordre du Gestionnaire du Service de protection des biens de PJV, le Dresseur principal (Chiens) donne au Directeur de l’Unité des chiens policiers et au Directeur de la police communautaire les conseils spécialisés dont ils ont besoin en matière canine.

3.20 À la demande du Directeur de l’Unité des chiens policiers et avec le formulaire d’approbation du Gestionnaire du Service de protection des biens de PJV, le Dresseur principal (Chiens) se rend à Bomana pour donner personnellement des conseils ou de la formation spécialisés, selon les besoins.

3.21 PJV veille à ce que l’Unité canine de la police de réserve expédie à chaque mois au Directeur de l’Unité des chiens policiers, au quartier général national de la police, un rapport sur le programme conjoint d’élevage de chiens.

4. Formation

Le Commissaire de police de la FCRPNG reconnaît que l’Unité de police de réserve de PJV est une cellule agréée de formation de la FCRPNG et qu’elle est chargée de fournir le matériel didactique approuvé. La cellule de formation de PJV fournit la formation convenue aux membres assermentés de la FCRPNG, notamment les membres réguliers ainsi que les membres de la police de réserve et de la police auxiliaire. Les conditions suivantes s’appliquent.

4.1 La formation donnée aux membres assermentés de la FCRPNG est approuvée par le Commissaire de police, le Directeur de la police communautaire et le Gestionnaire du Service de protection des biens de Porgera Joint Venture.

4.2 Les formateurs de PJV, quelle que soit la formation qu’ils donnent, sont des membres assermentés de l’Unité de police de réserve de PJV de la FCRPNG.

4.3 Les coûts afférents à la formation du personnel de la FCRPNG font l’objet des discussions et de l’entente visées au paragraphe 4.1 du présent document.

4.4 Porgera Joint Venture n’assume pas le coût de la formation des membres réguliers de la FCRPNG. [Page 8 de 9]

5. Application et durée

5.1 La présente entente est en vigueur à partir de la date de sa signature et jusqu’à ce qu’elle soit résiliée par accord mutuel entre les parties.

5.2 Chacune des parties peut résilier la présente entente en signifiant par écrit à l’autre partie, avec avis de quatre-vingt-dix (90) jours, son intention de s’en retirer au motif que l’autre partie ou les deux ne s’est (se sont) pas acquittée(s) des obligations qui lui (leur) incombent en vertu de l’entente.
5. Exécution

Le présent protocole d'entente a été signé et scellé en ce \( \text{\_ième} \) jour de 2005 par les parties mentionnées aux présentes.

Signé au nom de la Force constabulaire royale de Papouasie-Nouvelle-Guinée

________________________
S E. Inguba, CBE, QPM
Commissaire de la police
Force constabulaire royale de Papouasie-Nouvelle-Guinée

(Témoin)

Sceau de la Force constabulaire royale de Papouasie-Nouvelle-Guinée

Signé au nom de Placer (PNG) Limited, gestionnaires de Porgera Joint Venture

________________________
Brad GORDON, Directeur général
Placer (PNG Limited)

(Témoin)

Sceau de Placer (PNG) Limited
Appendix C: Medical Reports and Police Reports
30th November 2007

**AUTOPSY REPORT**

**Name:** Victim name redacted

**Age:** 21

**Sex:** Male

**Identification Process**

Identified by Relatives:

1. 
2. Three relative names redacted
3. 

Identified as: Victim name redacted

**Method used:** Visual

**Time of Autopsy:** 11:30 am

**Date of Autopsy:** 29th of November 2007

**Place of Autopsy:** Payam Hospital, Enga Province

**Present at Autopsy:**

**Paternal Relatives:**

1. 
2. Three relative names redacted - father’s side
3. 

**Maternal Relatives:**

1. Two relative names redacted - mother’s side

**Hospital Representative:**

1. 
2. Three Hospital representative names redacted
3. 

**Police Representative:**

1. Police Officer name redacted

**Time & Date of Death:** Between 1 and 2 am 28th November 2007

**Place of Death:** Yoko One Gate, PJV

**Cause of Death:** Intra-cranial Haemorrhage secondary to Gunshot wound to the Head.

**Report Summary**

The deceased was allegedly shot by police in front of the Yoko one gate at the Porgera Mine site on the early hours of 28th November 2007. He died on the spot. His body was brought to Payam Hospital Morgue at 5 pm on the same day.

The autopsy found a 1cm entrance wound at the fronto-parietal region of the head just above the hair line there was no exit wound. A small 2cm superficial laceration was also
found at the occipital area of the scalp. The projectile was fragmented as seen in the x-rays. Three fragments were recovered, the main fragment recovered at the left occipital lobe of the brain. The other small fragments were recovered at the right frontal lobe of the brain. There was also bleeding and haematomas at the occipital and frontal lobes of the brain. Size of main fragment is recovered 1.2 cm x 0.8 cm x 0.6 cm, smaller fragment measures 0.7 cm x 0.4 cm x 0.3 cm and the 3rd fragment is less than 2mm in diameter.

Cause of Death:
Intracranial Haemorrhage Secondary to Gunshot wound to the Head.

Physician signature redacted

PHYSICIAN - SURGEON
**ROYAL PAPUA NEW GUINEA CONSTABULARY**  
**CRIME REPORT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command</th>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Station</th>
<th>Charge Book Number</th>
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<td></td>
<td>ROY</td>
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<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**INFORMATION GIVEN BY**

Name: Witness name redacted  
Living at:  

**FOR PROM USE ONLY**

CRN:  

**VICTIM OR COMPLAINANT'S DETAILS**

Name: [Name redacted]  
Living at: [Address redacted]  
P.O. Box:  
Male/Female: M  
Age: 15  
Occupation: STUDENT  
Business Address:  
Telephone number:  

**DETAILS OF OFFENCE**

Type of Offence: POLICE SHOTING RESULTING 324714  
Committed at (location): ATV, MINE-SITE  
Between: Time: 10-11PM  
and Time: Day: Tuesday  
Date: 22/07/08  

Type of Premises (if applicable):  
How entered/weapon used (as applicable): Officer authenticated report by signing in presence of clinical team  

**STOLEN PROPERTY, if applicable**

Full description of stolen property (brand, make, model and serial numbers):  

Total value of property stolen:  
Total value of property recovered:  

Original: CRO 1
PERSONS ARRESTED if applicable

Name used from Province
Name used from Province
Name used from Province
Name used from Province

BRIEF REPORT OF CRIME AND RESULT OF INITIAL INQUIRIES

The deceased was outside the perimeter fence line known as SR 6 at 132 Amo-rite about 60 metres above the high ground. The LEDA of Tsimba who were on high ground first

Member Reporting: Number 1081 Rank DFC Name Member reporting name redacted

Note: The ORIGINAL is the investigator's copy, the DUPLICATE will be forwarded to the OIC/NCRO Police
- Headquarters as directed by C.S.O. 34/84

To be investigated by (s) Number 1081 Rank DFC Name Reporting member name redacted

Date: 07/07/08 Initials of OIC/CID (Station) 07/07/08

INVESTIGATION REPORT

(include full details of any person suspected)

Two LEDA members of Tsimba

Signature of Investigator Officer signature redacted Date 07/07/08
Signature of OIC/CID/Station Date
ROYAL PAPUA NEW GUINEA CONSTABULARY

MAJOR INCIDENT BRIEF

Major incident, which occurred within the 24 hours ending at 0600 hours on 22nd day of JULY 2008

Porgera
Station
Enga
Province

Nature of Crime: POLICE SHOOTING RESULTING DEATH

Date/Time Committed: TUESDAY 22nd JULY 2008 (10-11PM)

Name of Complainant: [REDACTED]
Address: [REDACTED]

ENG A PROVINCE

PARTICULARS OF VICTIM(S)

Full Name(s): [REDACTED]
Address: Yango Village, Laiagam, Enga
Age/Sex: MALE (54yrs) Occupation: STUDENT
Marital Status: SINGLE No of Children: 0

Laiagam, ENGA

Officer authenticated report by signing in presence of clinical team

25/07/09
Taken to Hospital: Yes/No (circle)

Property Stolen:

Value:

Weapon(s) Used: Yes, Firearms used.

BRIEF CIRCUMSTANCES
The deceased was outside the perimeter fence line known as 36 level at the PV mine site, about 150 metres above the high ground. The NS/4 members of the police who were on low ground fired upwards shots which resulted in his death. The policemen were there on fire basis.

POLICE ACTION
Crime Scene not visited post mortem done and investigations are still continuing due to obstructive manners by mine life police.


Member Reporting: [Member reporting name redacted]

Section: CID Forensic

Follow up Action Required: Yes/No

Signature: ________________________________
Section Head/ OIC CID/PSC/PPC
ROYAL PAPUA NEW GUINEA CONSTABULARY

To Whom It May Concern:

Porgera Police Station
P.O. Box 120
PAIAM
Porgera, Enga Province

Subject: Hinderence in to Police Investigations.

This is in reference to a case of Police shooting that had occurred at PTV mine site on Tuesday, 27th July, 2009 between the hours of 10.11 am.

The 14 members were on hire that time and performing their tasked duties within the company premises and had shot one namely [Victim name redacted] to death.

I as being the investigator was trying to carry out the investigation when an expatriate company investigatornamed John Murphy denied assisting me with the photos and any other foreign elements picked up from the scene.

To make it worse on my side of investigation he also denied providing me the company's time sheet or the duty roster of the 14 members concerned on that night.

Therefore, the case has been sitting pending till now.

The case is still sitting pending till now.

With that attached are the copies of Medical Report crime Report and Major Incident Form.

Officer authenticated report by signing in presence of clinical team.

25/03/09.

C/18 Porgera.
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

Dear Sir/Madam,

Re: POLICE REPORT ON DEATHS AT MINE SITE PORGERA – ENGA

Attached herewith are some of the autopsy reports from the hospital here at Paiam. There are so many deaths at the mine site but we the local police CID’s here at Porgera are not called to the crime scenes at the mine site, especially at the open pit. Deaths occurred at the open pit were only brought to the hospital and we local police CID’s only witnessed the post-mortems at the hospital.

There are so many deaths at the mine site but most of them are not reported to police. The relatives just take the bodies away home to bury them only. Only few of them are reported to police to witness the post-mortems at hospitals.

Some times we are called to the crime scene at the open pit but not deeply to the exact locations of the crime scenes. The words to us by the management is it is a no go zone and we are not taken to the exact locations of the crime scenes. We the local police have sworn to the God to go to the risky areas like the open pit, but could not understand the company’s regulations at the mine site for us the police to visit the crime scenes at the open pit.

They have their own investigators who attended the scenes and come to us with statements from eye witnesses from the mine site but it is not fair for them to carryout the investigations there within themselves. It has to be referred to us the local CID’s here but that does not happen up till then.

This genuine report of what actually happen at the giant Gold Mining of Porgera Valley in the Enga province and it is submitted to the Akali Tange association of Porgera Golden Valley upon request from the association.

If any doubt arises do not hesitate to contact writer on phone:

Yours faithfully,

[Officer name and signature redacted]
AUTOPSY REPORT

Name: Victim name redacted
Age: 15 years old
Sex: Male

Identification Process
Identified by:
1. Three identifier names redacted
2. Three identifier names redacted
3. Victim names redacted

Identification as
Method used – Visual
Time of Autopsy – 1:30 pm
Date of Autopsy – 25/07/08
Place of Autopsy – Porgera Hospital

Present at Autopsy:
Father's side:
1. Three relative names
2. redacted- father's side
3. 

Mother's side:
1. Three relative names
2. redacted- mother's side
3. 

Police Representative:
Hospital Representative:
Police representative name redacted
Hospital representative name redacted

Time & Date of Death: 8:30 pm, July 23, 2008
Place of Death: Top of open pit, level 36 at mine site
Cause of Death: Intra-cranial hemorrhage secondary to gunshot wound to the head.

Summary of Autopsy report:
The post mortem found a gunshot wound at the right eyebrow but with no exit wound. The entrance wound was about 1cm in diameter. There were two metal fragments (slugs) as seen on x-ray. The bigger fragment was about 8mm at its widest diameter was recovered at the right occipital lobe of the brain. The smaller fragment which was located at the right frontal lobe of the brain as seen on x-ray was not recovered. There was devitalized brain tissue at the right frontal, parietal and occipital lobes of the brain. There was moderate intra-cranial hemorrhage and sub-dural hemorrhage of the right side of the brain.
There is another gunshot wound at the flank of the right side of the abdomen. The gunshot shot wound is tangential in nature. It is about 2cm long, 1cm wide and 1cm deep. It did not penetrate the abdominal cavity. Cause of death: Intra-cranial hemorrhage secondary to

**Physician-surgeon's name and signature redacted**

**PHYSICIAN - SURGEON**
31st November 2007

Name: Victim name redacted
Age: 23
Sex: Male

Identification Process
Identified by Relatives:
Mother's side:
1. Three relative's names redacted- mother's side
2. Three relative's names redacted- mother's side
3. Three relative's names redacted- mother's side

Father's side:
1. Three relative's names redacted- father's side
2. Three relative's names redacted- father's side

Identified as –, Victim name redacted
Method used – Visual
Time of Autopsy – 3:05 pm
Date of Autopsy – 31st of December 2007
Place of Autopsy – Porgera Hospital

Present at Autopsy:
(Witness)

Six witness names redacted

Police Representative: Police representative name redacted

Time & Date of Death: 9:00am, 27th of December 2007
Place of Death: Alipis Village
Cause of Death: Hypovolemic shock due to bleeding from the heart and the upper lobe of the left lung secondary to gun shot wounds.

Report Summary
The deceased was among a group of illegal miners at PJV site, 36 levels, when the company security men open fired and shot him dead.

A limited post mortem was requested by the relatives of the deceased. The post mortem found that the body was at a bad state of decomposition. It was bloated, foul smelling and
body fluids oozing from the nose, ears and mouth. There were 3 gunshot wounds: 1.5 cm in diameter at the left upper back (Para vertebral). X-ray shows 4 projectile at the left upper chest and 1 projectile at the left lower chest. Only 1 projectile was recovered at the 3rd intercostals space embedded in the muscle. The 3rd posterior rib, left, was fractured. The bullet penetrated the left thoracic cavity and hit the upper lobe of the left lung and the upper chambers of the heart. There was blood in the left thoracic cavity and pericardial space.

Doctor’s signature and name redacted

PHYSICIAN - SURGEON
Post Mortem Report

Victim name redacted: 24 years old, male, a resident of Kagua District, Southern Highland Province was brought to the morgue of this hospital. According to the informant, the deceased was hit by an avalanche of stone allegedly pushed by the security guard at the minesite. According to the informant, the deceased died at the site of the accident.

Present at the post mortem examination were as follows:

Police Officer: Police Representative name redacted

Father’s side: Three relative names redacted - father’s side

Mother’s side: Three relative names redacted - mother’s side

Hospital: Hospital personnel name redacted

Patient was brought to the x-ray room for bone mapping. Also external examination was done. Noted a multiple rugged open wounds at the head especially at the right frontoparietal area and the right side of the chest with minimal swelling. X-ray result showed a massive multiple fracture of the skull frontoparietal area, right scapula, 1st to 9th ribs with contusion to the right lungs and brachial artery and veins.

Caused of death: Acute cardiopulmonary arrest due multiple injury to the head and right chest with fracture of the skull with intracerebral bleeding and multiple bone fracture involving the right scapula and ribs with massive lung tissue injury due to crushing injury due to blunt trauma (falling stones).

Physician surgeon name and signature redacted

Physician - Surgeon, Examiner
Barrick Gold Corporation and the Porgera Joint Venture (PJV) are committed to protecting the human rights and dignity of women, men and children living near the Porgera mine in Papua New Guinea (PNG). As responsible mining companies, we operate aligned with the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights and do not tolerate criminal conduct by any person in our employment.

Earlier this month, the Business and Human Rights Resource Centre forwarded to Barrick a report prepared by Mr. Tyler Giannini from Harvard Law School and Ms. Sarah Knuckey from New York University School of Law. This report was originally submitted to members of the Canadian Parliament’s Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development in connection with their October 2009 testimony. This marks the first time Barrick or PJV have been provided with a copy of this document.

The report contains a number of very serious allegations, including alleged criminal offences involving security personnel at the Porgera mine. These allegations are of great concern to us and should be pursued by the proper legal authorities in Papua New Guinea. For this reason, we have submitted the report to the Police Commissioner and Ombudsman of Papua New Guinea. We also wish to outline recent company actions taken by PJV and Barrick concerning these allegations.

We strongly urge Mr. Giannini and Ms. Knuckey, who may be in receipt of information dating back as early as 2006, to provide all supporting documentation immediately to PNG authorities to enable them to conduct a complete investigation.

We also note that the Giannini/Knuckey report contains a number of material errors of fact which lead to false conclusions. Barrick attempted to engage in a constructive dialogue with Mr. Giannini and communicated our concerns in writing. For the purposes of this limited response, we have selected some representative errors, which we wish to correct for the record. (See link: Response to allegations regarding the relationship between PJV and the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary).

Response to Allegations of Sexual Assault by Porgera Security Personnel

Sexual assault is a repugnant criminal act which Barrick and the Porgera Joint Venture condemn in the strongest possible terms.

Before receiving the Giannini/Knuckey report, Barrick and the Porgera Joint Venture had commenced an investigation into alarming allegations that Porgera security personnel may have been involved in sexual assaults of women on mine property. A representative of PJV was advised verbally of these allegations, in general terms, during a meeting with a representative of Human Rights Watch in May 2010.

Following a further request from PJV, Human Rights Watch provided more detailed written information to the company. This marked the first time that specific and detailed allegations of sexual assault by PJV employees have been shared with Barrick and PJV.

Upon receipt of this additional information from Human Rights Watch, PJV immediately contacted the police and provided the written information received from Human Rights Watch, and requested that the police conduct a formal criminal investigation into this extremely serious matter. We appreciate Human Rights Watch’s willingness to share this information, as it will greatly assist authorities as they act on this matter.
We are also aware that allegations concerning police conduct have been raised. Since this concerns the police, we have reported it to Commissioner of Police and the Ombudsman of PNG. The Ombudsman’s role includes providing independent oversight of police activities.

It is our understanding that PNG authorities have established a police task force which is taking a three-pronged approach to investigating the relevant allegations that have been made to date: the criminal investigations branch of the police will investigate the allegations raised with respect to PJV security personnel; the internal affairs branch of the police will investigate allegations made against the police; and the Ombudsman will monitor the investigation of the allegations relating to the police. PJV has committed to police authorities that it will do all it can to support and co-operate with the police investigation including any criminal proceedings that result against any persons found to be involved.

Following PJV’s referral of the Human Rights Watch allegations to the police, PJV engaged Papua New Guinea’s highly respected former Chief Ombudsman and statesperson Mr. Ila Geno to make independent inquiries within the community into the sexual assault allegations. PJV and Barrick are committed to doing all that we can to ensure these matters are fully and properly investigated and that any person involved in committing these offenses is brought to justice. The expectation is that Mr. Geno will refer the results of these inquiries to the police task force once it has arrived in the region, in order to assist task force members in conducting a thorough and comprehensive investigation.

We urge any person or organization that may have credible information or evidence that could assist with this criminal investigation to provide it immediately to PNG authorities. All parties have a responsibility to support these police investigations, working within existing legal and judicial institutions in Papua New Guinea.

Porgera Women’s Welfare Liaison Officer

Violence against women and sexual assault are widespread and pervasive problems within Papua New Guinean society. Women who are victims of violence may be reluctant to report this crime to police, judicial authorities and community leaders for a variety of reasons.

In June 2010, Barrick and PJV announced the creation of a Women’s Welfare Liaison Office, a new position which will be affiliated with the Porgera District Women’s Association (PDWA), at arm’s length from PJV. The Women’s Welfare Liaison Officer will serve women living in the communities near the Porgera mine by providing an additional support mechanism for victims of sexual and physical assault to enable them to come forward, receive counseling and support and seek redress under the law.

PJV is currently working with the PDWA to advance this initiative and has been a primary funder of this non-governmental organization that has a membership of more than 2,000 women. We anticipate that this new officer position will increase the capacity of the PDWA. We welcome the input of civil society and other interested parties to ensure this position empowers women to uphold their rights under PNG law.

Understanding Violence against Women in PNG

As part of ongoing efforts to better understand the complex social and cultural factors associated with violence against women, we will be engaging external researchers with expertise in this area to examine this issue in a culturally- and gender-sensitive manner, working with local community leaders and others. A key objective will be to identify key factors and barriers to the reporting of these offences and the prosecution of offenders.
Other Actions Underway

In light of the concerns that have been raised, Barrick and PJV will also assess ways to further improve the security environment and the safety and security of women and men on mine property.

PJV is an active partner in the Restoring Justice Initiative, a government-community initiative in the Porgera region to strengthen law and order and improve the safety and security of the community, addressing such issues as violence against women and recourse to justice. We are continuing to engage in this important community-based justice initiative.

Barrick is committed to responsible mining, which is central to our way of doing business around the world. We will not tolerate violence against women at any of our operations and will provide any necessary assistance to police and government agencies as they investigate these matters.

Response to allegations regarding the relationship between PJV and the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary

Although we dispute many of the matters raised in the Giannini/Knuckey report, we take particular issue with the section concerning the relationship between PJV, police reservists, and the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary (RPNGC). The report mischaracterizes this relationship and draws conclusions based on several factual errors.

There is simply no basis for asserting that PJV is undertaking “a state function” by providing internal security. Maintaining law and order in Papua New Guinea society is the responsibility of the Government of Papua New Guinea, in particular the police, under the National Constitution of Papua New Guinea.

PJV has taken action in the past to ensure that the State fulfill its obligation to maintain law and order. In late 2005, PJV obtained a court order requiring the Government of PNG to adequately respond to the deteriorating law and order situation in the Porgera region, particularly relating to illegal mining. The court order required the State to meet its responsibilities under the PNG Mining Act and maintain law and order by providing police services to address illegal mining on the Special Mining Lease. This clearly was not the action of a company “jointly undertaking a state function.”

Illegal mining and related illegal activities have had a profoundly detrimental affect on law-abiding residents in the Porgera valley. The report reflects only the most elementary understanding of unique police structures and law and order challenges within PNG and misconstrues the role of the Reserve Constabulary.

The RPNGC has a Regular Constabulary which comprises rank and file police. The Police Act also establishes the Reserve Constabulary, which acts to support the operations of the Regular Constabulary when required. Members of the Reserve Constabulary act as reservists when called up by the local Police Commander, as a delegate of the Police Commissioner.

Within PNG, many Papua New Guineans are members of the Reserve Constabulary and serve as reservists. Many do so out of a sense of duty to help maintain law and order in their community, recognizing that the RPNGC is constrained by limited resources. Several private companies make their personnel available to serve as reserve police, just as PJV does. Overall, police reservists play a crucial role in supporting police personnel in their efforts to maintain law and order, enforce PNG law and protect the people of Papua New Guinea.
Members of the Regular Constabulary report to a local police station commander and operate within a particular area. Local members of the Reserve Constabulary support the work of the local police constabulary in the area, as directed by the local police station commander.

Mobile police squads form part of the Special Services Division, a distinct branch of the national police. Mobile police squads are rapid deployment units for dispatch to a particular region for a finite period of time only, as was the case during the “Operation Ipili” deployment of Port Moresby-based mobile police units to the Porgera region in 2009. The command structure for mobile police squads is based in Port Moresby. Members of the mobile police squads are drawn from the Regular Constabulary. Thus, a reservist cannot be a member of the mobile police squad.

Reservist duties range from routine tasks such as prisoner or vehicle escorts to assisting police to attend more serious tribal disputes and other serious confrontations, where no other options exist and police resources are inadequate.

In 2005, Placer Dome (PNG) Limited (now Barrick (Niugini) Limited) entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with the RPNGC to record the arrangements between these two parties. The 2005 MOU clearly acknowledges that the RPNGC is the established police force for Papua New Guinea as provided in the National Constitution and is responsible for maintaining and enforcing the law in Papua New Guinea. The MOU details the relationship between the parties and conditions associated with support to be provided by PJV to the RPNGC in Porgera.

The 2005 MOU is consistent with global best practice and the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights and expressly makes reference to the Voluntary Principles. The MOU sets out the terms and conditions for PJV employees in PJV’s security department who wish to become or are members of the Reserve Constabulary of the PNG police to be released from active PJV duties to serve as police reservists under the command and control of the police station commander. The number of PJV security personnel who are members of the Reserve Constabulary comprise less than 15 per cent of total department numbers.

The Gianinni/Knuckey report states that a copy of the 2005 MOU was shared by an “official of the police force”, however the document appended to their report is different in material respects from the signed 2005 MOU. The report’s authors then quote from and draw conclusions based on this inaccurate and improperly verified document.

Under the PNG Police Act of 1998, and the 2005 MOU, police reservists are answerable to and act under the command of the local police station commander, under the delegated authority of the Police Commissioner. When called up by the local police station commander or other RPNGC personnel, as stipulated in the MOU, PJV employees who are reservists are released from company duty to act as reservists under the control of the police station commander. In acting as reservists, they do not take orders from mine officials or simultaneously act as an “employee of the PJV”, as claimed.

A few further examples of errors or false allegations contained in this section of the report include the following:

- The report says that “state police reservists will be deployed to the mine and be ‘employees of PJV,’” which implies the State sends or appoints officers to the mine. This is not the case. As noted, reserve police personnel at Porgera are existing employees who, through training and qualification, are eligible to apply to become members of the RPNGC reserve police. Applications are managed by RPNGC personnel in Port Moresby and all appointments are made according to RPNGC regulations and policies. PJV has no control or authority over these appointments.
• The report alleges that a PJV employee obstructed an unnamed local police offer in conducting an investigation by refusing to provide time sheets relating to mobile police squad deployments. Page 18 of the report reads “...he tried to investigate the incident and had requested a time sheet from PJV to identify the shooters.” This allegation dates back to 2008 and, as per normal police protocol and the 2005 MOU, PJV does not maintain or have access to time sheets of mobile police squad officers. PJV has no operational control over RPNGC mobile squads. In conducting this investigation, the officer should have known that such information is exclusively the preserve of the RPNGC and should have made his query to the mobile squad commander of the squad in question.

• The report includes photographs of a reservist taken on March 25, 2009 (see pg. 10). We have confirmed that on this date a police reservist was on duty and acting under the direction of the local police commander, as is appropriate and consistent with the provisions of the MOU and PNG law.

In conclusion, we wish to thank Business and Human Rights Resource Centre for providing a copy of this report and for permitting Barrick to provide our perspective and raise our concerns.